fix(security): remove insecure HMAC fallback in JWT validation - #215
fix(security): remove insecure HMAC fallback in JWT validation#215NP-compete wants to merge 4 commits into
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The _hmac_validate() fallback used hashlib.sha256(secret + input) instead of proper HMAC, making it vulnerable to length extension attacks. Since PyJWT is a hard dependency (PyJWT[crypto]>=2.8.0), the ImportError fallback was dead code. Remove it entirely rather than fixing the insecure construction. Signed-off-by: Soham Dutta <19648293+NP-compete@users.noreply.github.com>
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Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The PR removes the insecure JWT fallback and relies on PyJWT, but the dependency still allows unreviewed future versions. The change is otherwise localized and mergeable with explicit owner follow-up to pin PyJWT to an approved exact version or bounded range. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In `@deep_agent/aegra/middleware.py`:
- Around line 49-50: Update the dependency constraint for PyJWT with crypto
support to require version 2.12.0 or newer, ensuring the package configuration
used by the JWT decode flow enforces this minimum while preserving the existing
JWT_SECRET, JWT_ALGORITHM, and claims handling.
In `@tests/unit/aegra/test_middleware.py`:
- Around line 45-48: Update test_invalid_signature_raises to generate a
structurally valid HS256 JWT signed with a different secret while JWT_SECRET is
patched, then assert validate_jwt_token accepts a token signed with the
configured secret. Keep the AuthError assertion for the mismatched-signature
token so the tests distinguish invalid signatures from blanket token rejection.
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- Bump PyJWT minimum to >=2.12.0 for CVE-2026-32597 (crit header validation bypass) - Use structurally valid HS256 JWT signed with wrong secret in test_invalid_signature_raises - Add test_valid_token_accepted to verify the happy path Signed-off-by: Soham Dutta <19648293+NP-compete@users.noreply.github.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@pyproject.toml`:
- Line 37: Update the PyJWT dependency declaration in the project dependency
list to use the approved exact version or bounded range instead of an unbounded
lower constraint, while retaining the crypto extra.
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Inline comments:
In `@pyproject.toml`:
- Line 37: Update the PyJWT[crypto] dependency constraint in the project
dependencies from >=2.12.0 to >=2.13.0, ensuring vulnerable 2.12.x releases are
excluded.
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PyJWT 2.12.0-2.12.1 have vulnerabilities related to RFC 7797 b64 header handling that are fixed in 2.13.0. Signed-off-by: Soham Dutta <19648293+NP-compete@users.noreply.github.com>
Summary
Closes #214
_hmac_validate()which usedhashlib.sha256(secret + input)instead of proper HMAC (vulnerable to length extension attacks)ImportErrorfallback invalidate_jwt_token()since PyJWT is a hard dependencyhashlibimportvalidate_jwt_tokendirectly instead of the removed internal functionTest plan
validate_jwt_tokenraisesAuthErrorfor malformed tokensvalidate_jwt_tokenraisesAuthErrorfor invalid signatures