fix: reduce false positives in suspicious pattern detection for OAuth skills

[superlowburn]

Summary

Fixes #209 by removing overly broad regex patterns that flag legitimate authentication and payment integration skills.

Partially addresses #211 — removes the overly broad suspicious.secrets and suspicious.crypto patterns that caused the most false positives for security-related skills. Note: suspicious.keyword patterns remain and may still contribute to false positives tracked in #211.

Problem

Skills like openbotauth (OAuth identity verification) were being flagged as suspicious because they mention "token", "api key", or "password" in their description or metadata.

As @hammadtq reported in #209:

"Identities in our implementation are linked to Github oAuth... our skill then uses that token to link its locally generated keypair with that oAuth token. Since this step is manual, hence token pasting is required."

The regex scanner was too aggressive, catching legitimate auth flows alongside actual threats.

Root Cause

The suspicious.secrets and suspicious.crypto patterns flagged ANY mention of:

• token, api key, password, private key, secret
• wallet, seed phrase, mnemonic, crypto

These keywords appear in MANY legitimate skills:

• OAuth skills (openbotauth) mention "token" for authentication flows
• API integrations (trello, stripe) mention "api key" for service credentials
• Database connectors mention "password" for connections
• Crypto wallet skills mention "seed phrase" for key management

Solution

Removed the overly broad suspicious.secrets and suspicious.crypto patterns. The LLM evaluator already handles credential proportionality analysis (section 4 of security prompt). The regex scan should only catch ACTUAL malicious patterns, not keywords that appear in legitimate contexts.

What Still Gets Flagged

Kept patterns that catch real threats:

• suspicious.keyword - malware, stealer, phishing, keylogger
• suspicious.webhook - discord/slack webhooks (data exfiltration)
• suspicious.script - curl | bash (arbitrary code execution)
• suspicious.url_shortener - bit.ly, tinyurl (URL obfuscation)
• blocked.malware - known malicious patterns

Changes

• Removed suspicious.secrets and suspicious.crypto regex patterns
• Added 18 comprehensive tests for pattern detection
• Added explanatory comments for each remaining pattern
• Verified OAuth/auth skills are NOT flagged
• Verified malicious patterns ARE still flagged

Testing

• Added 18 new tests ✅
• All 418 existing tests pass ✅
• No existing test assertions changed ✅

Specific test coverage:

• OAuth skills mentioning tokens → NOT flagged
• API integrations mentioning keys → NOT flagged
• Database skills mentioning passwords → NOT flagged
• Crypto wallets mentioning seed phrases → NOT flagged
• Malware keywords → still flagged
• Webhooks → still flagged
• curl | bash → still flagged

Security Impact

This does NOT weaken security:

• The LLM evaluator still analyzes credential proportionality (security prompt section 4)
• Actual malicious patterns (webhooks, curl|bash, malware keywords) are still caught
• Only removes false positives on legitimate auth keywords
• The regex scan is a pre-filter; the LLM makes the final judgment

Confidence

92% - Clear root cause (overly broad regex), targeted fix (remove false-positive patterns), comprehensive tests (18 new + all existing pass), minimal security impact (LLM still evaluates credentials).

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

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[greptile-apps]

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[greptile-apps]

Additional Comments (1)

package.json
Tests not runnable

The PR claims all tests pass, but in this repo bun run test shells out to vitest run (package.json:15). In this environment that fails with vitest: command not found, so the new convex/lib/moderation.test.ts coverage can’t actually be validated here. Please ensure the PR’s CI/setup installs dependencies (or that contributors run bun install first) and that the test command succeeds in a clean checkout.

Prompt To Fix With AI

This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: package.json
Line: 13:16

Comment:
**Tests not runnable**

The PR claims all tests pass, but in this repo `bun run test` shells out to `vitest run` (`package.json:15`). In this environment that fails with `vitest: command not found`, so the new `convex/lib/moderation.test.ts` coverage can’t actually be validated here. Please ensure the PR’s CI/setup installs dependencies (or that contributors run `bun install` first) and that the test command succeeds in a clean checkout.

How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

[superlowburn]

Re: greptile's "Tests not runnable" flag —

vitest is a devDependency ("vitest": "^3.0.4" in package.json). Running bun install installs it, and bun run test → vitest run works as expected. All 18 tests pass locally after install.

This is an environment limitation in greptile's sandbox (no bun install step), not a missing dependency in the project.

[globalcaos]

+1 for this fix. We're directly impacted — 4 of our skills were delisted (#314):

• token-panel-ultimate — tracks AI token usage/budgets. Flagged because "token" is literally in the name.
• shell-security-ultimate — classifies shell commands by risk level. Flagged because it discusses security patterns.
• agent-memory-ultimate — cognitive memory system for agents. Likely flagged for mentions of "key" in knowledge graph context.
• youtube-ultimate — YouTube transcript/download skill. Unclear why flagged.

The irony: a skill designed to improve agent security (shell-security-ultimate) was flagged as suspicious by the security scanner. The regex approach fundamentally can't distinguish "mentions security concepts" from "is a security threat."

The LLM evaluator approach in section 4 of the security prompt is the right call — context matters more than keyword presence. Happy to see this moving forward.