chore(deps): update module github.com/quic-go/quic-go to v0.57.0 [security] #34
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ℹ️ Artifact update noticeFile name: go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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This PR contains the following updates:
v0.54.0→v0.57.0GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-59530
Summary
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger an assertion in a quic-go client (and crash the process) by sending a premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frame during the handshake.
Impact
A misbehaving or malicious server can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the quic-go client by triggering an assertion failure, leading to a process crash. This requires no authentication and can be exploited during the handshake phase. Observed in the wild with certain server implementations (e.g. Solana's Firedancer QUIC).
Affected Versions
Users are recommended to upgrade to the latest patched version in their respective maintenance branch or to v0.55.0 or later.
Details
For a regular 1-RTT handshake, QUIC uses three sets of keys to encrypt / decrypt QUIC packets:
On the client side, Initial keys are discarded when the first Handshake packet is sent. Handshake keys are discarded when the server's HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received, as specified in section 4.9.2 of RFC 9001. Crucially, Initial keys are always dropped before Handshake keys in a standard handshake.
Due to packet reordering, it is possible to receive a packet with a higher encryption level before the key for that encryption level has been derived. For example, the server's Handshake packets (containing, among others, the TLS certificate) might arrive before the server's Initial packet (which contains the TLS ServerHello). In that case, the client queues the Handshake packets and decrypts them as soon as it has processed the ServerHello and derived Handshake keys.
After completion of the handshake, Initial and Handshake packets are not needed anymore and will be dropped. quic-go implements an assertion that no packets are queued after completion of the handshake.
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger this assertion, and thereby cause a panic, by sending a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame before actually completing the handshake. In that case, Handshake keys would be dropped before Initial keys.
This can only happen if the server implementation is misbehaving: the server can only complete the handshake after receiving the client's TLS Finished message (which is sent in Handshake packets).
The Fix
quic-go needs to be able to handle misbehaving server implementations, including those that prematurely send a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame. We now discard Initial keys when receiving a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame, thereby correctly handling premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frames. The fix was implemented in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/5354.
CVE-2025-64702
Summary
An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in quic-go's HTTP/3 client and server implementations by sending a QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame that decodes into a large header field section (many unique header names and/or large values). The implementation builds an
http.Header(used on thehttp.Requestandhttp.Response, respectively), while only enforcing limits on the size of the (QPACK-compressed) HEADERS frame, but not on the decoded header, leading to memory exhaustion.Impact
A misbehaving or malicious peer can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on quic-go's HTTP/3 servers or clients by triggering excessive memory allocation, potentially leading to crashes or exhaustion. It affects both servers and clients due to symmetric header construction.
Details
In HTTP/3, headers are compressed using QPACK (RFC 9204). quic-go's HTTP/3 server (and client) decodes the QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame into header fields, then constructs an http.Request (or response).
http3.Server.MaxHeaderBytesandhttp3.Transport.MaxResponseHeaderBytes, respectively, limit encoded HEADERS frame size (default: 1 MB server, 10 MB client), but not decoded size. A maliciously crafted HEADERS frame can expand to ~50x the encoded size using QPACK static table entries with long names / values.RFC 9114 requires enforcing decoded field section size limits via SETTINGS, which quic-go did not do.
The Fix
quic-go now enforces RFC 9114 decoded field section size limits, sending SETTINGS_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE and using incremental QPACK decoding to check the header size after each entry, aborting early on violations with HTTP 431 (on the server side) and stream reset (on the client side).
quic-go: Panic occurs when queuing undecryptable packets after handshake completion
CVE-2025-59530 / GHSA-47m2-4cr7-mhcw / GO-2025-4017
More information
Details
Summary
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger an assertion in a quic-go client (and crash the process) by sending a premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frame during the handshake.
Impact
A misbehaving or malicious server can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the quic-go client by triggering an assertion failure, leading to a process crash. This requires no authentication and can be exploited during the handshake phase. Observed in the wild with certain server implementations (e.g. Solana's Firedancer QUIC).
Affected Versions
Users are recommended to upgrade to the latest patched version in their respective maintenance branch or to v0.55.0 or later.
Details
For a regular 1-RTT handshake, QUIC uses three sets of keys to encrypt / decrypt QUIC packets:
On the client side, Initial keys are discarded when the first Handshake packet is sent. Handshake keys are discarded when the server's HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received, as specified in section 4.9.2 of RFC 9001. Crucially, Initial keys are always dropped before Handshake keys in a standard handshake.
Due to packet reordering, it is possible to receive a packet with a higher encryption level before the key for that encryption level has been derived. For example, the server's Handshake packets (containing, among others, the TLS certificate) might arrive before the server's Initial packet (which contains the TLS ServerHello). In that case, the client queues the Handshake packets and decrypts them as soon as it has processed the ServerHello and derived Handshake keys.
After completion of the handshake, Initial and Handshake packets are not needed anymore and will be dropped. quic-go implements an assertion that no packets are queued after completion of the handshake.
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger this assertion, and thereby cause a panic, by sending a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame before actually completing the handshake. In that case, Handshake keys would be dropped before Initial keys.
This can only happen if the server implementation is misbehaving: the server can only complete the handshake after receiving the client's TLS Finished message (which is sent in Handshake packets).
The Fix
quic-go needs to be able to handle misbehaving server implementations, including those that prematurely send a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame. We now discard Initial keys when receiving a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame, thereby correctly handling premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frames. The fix was implemented in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/5354.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Panic occurs when queuing undecryptable packets after handshake completion in github.com/quic-go/quic-go
CVE-2025-59530 / GHSA-47m2-4cr7-mhcw / GO-2025-4017
More information
Details
Panic occurs when queuing undecryptable packets after handshake completion in github.com/quic-go/quic-go
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
HTTP/3 QPACK Header Expansion DoS in github.com/quic-go/quic-go
CVE-2025-64702 / GHSA-g754-hx8w-x2g6 / GO-2025-4233
More information
Details
HTTP/3 QPACK Header Expansion DoS in github.com/quic-go/quic-go
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
quic-go HTTP/3 QPACK Header Expansion DoS
CVE-2025-64702 / GHSA-g754-hx8w-x2g6 / GO-2025-4233
More information
Details
Summary
An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in quic-go's HTTP/3 client and server implementations by sending a QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame that decodes into a large header field section (many unique header names and/or large values). The implementation builds an
http.Header(used on thehttp.Requestandhttp.Response, respectively), while only enforcing limits on the size of the (QPACK-compressed) HEADERS frame, but not on the decoded header, leading to memory exhaustion.Impact
A misbehaving or malicious peer can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on quic-go's HTTP/3 servers or clients by triggering excessive memory allocation, potentially leading to crashes or exhaustion. It affects both servers and clients due to symmetric header construction.
Details
In HTTP/3, headers are compressed using QPACK (RFC 9204). quic-go's HTTP/3 server (and client) decodes the QPACK-encoded HEADERS frame into header fields, then constructs an http.Request (or response).
http3.Server.MaxHeaderBytesandhttp3.Transport.MaxResponseHeaderBytes, respectively, limit encoded HEADERS frame size (default: 1 MB server, 10 MB client), but not decoded size. A maliciously crafted HEADERS frame can expand to ~50x the encoded size using QPACK static table entries with long names / values.RFC 9114 requires enforcing decoded field section size limits via SETTINGS, which quic-go did not do.
The Fix
quic-go now enforces RFC 9114 decoded field section size limits, sending SETTINGS_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE and using incremental QPACK decoding to check the header size after each entry, aborting early on violations with HTTP 431 (on the server side) and stream reset (on the client side).
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
quic-go/quic-go (github.com/quic-go/quic-go)
v0.57.0Compare Source
This release reworks the HTTP/3 header processing logic:
Breaking Changes
Transport.MaxResponseBytesis now anint(before:int64): #5433Notable Fixes
What's Changed
New Contributors
Full Changelog: quic-go/quic-go@v0.56.0...v0.57.0
v0.56.0Compare Source
This release introduces qlog support for HTTP/3 (#5367, #5372, #5374, #5375, #5376, #5381, #5383).
For this, we completely changed how connection tracing works. Instead of a general-purpose
logging.ConnectionTracer(which we removed entirely), we now have a qlog-specific tracer (#5356, #5417). quic-go users can now implement their own qlog events.It also removes the Prometheus-based metrics collection. Please comment on the tracking issue (#5294) if you rely on metrics and are interested in seeing metrics brought back in a future release.
Notable Changes
Behind the Scenes
Go 1.25 introduced support for testing concurrent code using
testing/synctest. We've been working on transitioning tests to use synctest (#5357, #5391, #5393, #5397, #5398, #5403, #5414, #5415), using @MarcoPolo's simnet package to simulate a network in memory.Using synctest makes test execution more reliable (reducing flakiness). The use of a synthetic clock leads to a massive speedup; the execution time of some integration tests was reduced from 20s to less than 1ms. The work will continue for the next release (see tracking issue: #5386).
Changelog
New Contributors
Full Changelog: quic-go/quic-go@v0.55.0...v0.56.0
v0.55.0Compare Source
This release contains a number of improvements and fixes, and it updates the supported Go versions to 1.24 and 1.25.
Optimizations
When sending packets on a QUIC connection, RFC 9002 requires us to save the timestamp for every packet sent. In #5344, we implemented a memory-optimized drop-in replacement for
time.Time, which reduces the memory required from 24 to 8 bytes, and vastly speeds up timer calculations (which happen very frequently).New Features
Conn.ConnectionStats, thanks to @MarcoPoloNotable Fixes
Transport: #5324, thanks to @GloneeTransport.Roundtripcalls: #5323, thanks to @GloneeBehind the Scenes
We have started transitioning tests to make use of the new
synctestpackage that was added in Go 1.25 (and was available as aGOEXPERIMENTin Go 1.24): #5291, #5296, #5298, #5299, #5302, #5304, #5305, #5306, #5317. This is a lot of work, but it makes the test execution both faster and more reliable.Changelog
interface{}withanyby @marten-seemann in #5290go mod tidy -diffto check for tidiedgo.modby @marten-seemann in #5303New Contributors
Full Changelog: quic-go/quic-go@v0.54.0...v0.55.0
v0.54.1Compare Source
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