fix: database query built from user-controlled sources #290
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Summary of ChangesHello @odaysec, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request addresses a critical security vulnerability by implementing stringent input validation for database table names that are constructed from user-controlled input. By introducing a regular expression-based validation function, the changes ensure that only safely formatted table names are used in SQL queries, thereby preventing SQL injection attacks and significantly enhancing the application's security posture. Highlights
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Welcome @odaysec! It looks like this is your first PR to karmada-io/dashboard 🎉 |
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Code Review
This pull request aims to fix a SQL injection vulnerability by validating user-provided table names. The introduction of isValidTableName and its use in queryMetricNames is a good step in the right direction. However, the implementation has a couple of issues that need addressing.
First, the regular expression in isValidTableName is compiled on every function call, which is inefficient. I've left a specific comment with a suggestion to compile it once at the package level for better performance.
More critically, the fix is incomplete. The function queryMetricDetailsByName in the same file also constructs SQL queries from the user-provided sanitizedPodName but does not use the new validation function. This leaves a significant SQL injection vulnerability open. Furthermore, the use of ? as placeholders for table names in queryMetricDetailsByName is incorrect and will likely cause runtime errors. Table names cannot be parameterized this way and must be safely interpolated into the query string after thorough validation.
To fully address the vulnerability, it is crucial to apply isValidTableName validation within queryMetricDetailsByName and correct the SQL query construction there.
| func isValidTableName(name string) bool { | ||
| // Only allow table names that start with a letter or underscore, then letters, numbers, underscores, up to 64 chars | ||
| // Adjust length as per your table name limits (e.g., SQLite, MySQL usually 64) | ||
| validTableName := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$`) |
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regexp.MustCompile is a relatively expensive operation. Compiling the regular expression on every call to isValidTableName is inefficient. It's a best practice in Go to compile regular expressions once at the package level (e.g., in a var block at the top of the file) and reuse the compiled object. This will improve performance significantly if the function is called frequently.
For example:
var (
validTableName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$`)
)
// ... in isValidTableName ...
return validTableName.MatchString(name)
Signed-off-by: Jörmungandrk <[email protected]>
| func isValidTableName(name string) bool { | ||
| // Only allow table names that start with a letter or underscore, then letters, numbers, underscores, up to 64 chars | ||
| // Adjust length as per your table name limits (e.g., SQLite, MySQL usually 64) | ||
| validTableName := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$`) |
| if !isValidTableName(sanitizedPodName) { | ||
| log.Printf("Invalid table name: %v", sanitizedPodName) | ||
| c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "Invalid table name"}) | ||
| return | ||
| } |
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Right, this is a typical SQL injection issue, like an attacker could exploit this by providing a malicious table name (e.g., podName; DROP TABLE users; --), which could result in data deletion...
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@odaysec Thank you for doing this. Just out of curiosity, how do you find this? Are you evaluating the security of this project or something? |
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cc @warjiang |
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@odaysec thanks for your kindly remind for the potential security problems, the changes in the PR would make the |
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[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED This pull-request has been approved by: poratoes The full list of commands accepted by this bot can be found here.
Needs approval from an approver in each of these files:
Approvers can indicate their approval by writing |
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/kind bug
/kind feature
The safest approach is to only allow table names that match a trusted, known set of pod names, or at minimum validate that the input conforms precisely to the naming rules of expected tables (e.g., by a regular expression matching only valid table names consisting of alphanumeric characters and underscores, starting with a letter, and of reasonable length). This should be done before inserting the value as an identifier into the SQL string.
To implement this in the current file (
cmd/metrics-scraper/app/routes/metrics/handlerqueries.go), we need to:isValidTableName) to check thatsanitizedPodNamematches a safe pattern (like^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$).regexppackage for pattern matching.queryMetricNamesbefore using the table name.