fix(fs): validate paths on all read-side MountableFs APIs#1556
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read_file, stat, read_dir, exists, and read_link previously delegated to the underlying backend without calling validate_path() first, so mounted backends could receive control-character / depth-limit / length-limit violating paths through any read API. Add the same validation guard already applied to write_file, mkdir, remove, rename, copy, symlink, chmod, and set_modified_time. Closes #1548
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Summary
MountableFsalready callsvalidate_path()before delegating writes (write_file,append_file,mkdir,remove,rename/copysource,symlinklink,chmod,set_modified_time), but the read-side methods (read_file,stat,read_dir,exists,read_link) delegated without validation. With mountedRealFsor third-partyFileSystemimplementations, this lets a script reach the backend with control-character / depth-limit / length-limit violating paths through any read API — weakening the path-policy boundary and making it a DoS / diagnostic-leak surface.Why
Closes #1548 (TM-DOS-046 read-side gaps).
How
Add the existing
validate_path()guard at the top of every path-taking publicFileSystemmethod onMountableFs.rename/copyalready validated both source and destination, so cross-mount semantics stay correct.Tests
New regression tests in
tests/security_audit_pocs.rscovering invalid paths through:read_filestatread_direxistsread_linkrename(destination side)copy(destination side)All 2258 lib tests + the new POC tests pass; existing mount/unmount/access tests unaffected.
cargo fmt --checkandcargo clippy --all-targets --features http_client -- -D warningsare green.Generated by Claude Code