ci: declare empty permissions on release workflow#1981
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The release job clones with DENOBOT_PAT and runs the publish_release
task using the same PAT as GITHUB_TOKEN. The workflow's own GITHUB_TOKEN
is unused. permissions:{} captures that.
Style matches the per-job blocks already declared elsewhere in this
repo's hardened workflows.
Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Pins the release job to
permissions: {}. The job checks out the repo withsecrets.DENOBOT_PATand runsdeno run -A .../publish_release.tswithGITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.DENOBOT_PAT }}. The workflow's ownGITHUB_TOKENis never used.Defense-in-depth angle: a compromised third-party action (cf. CVE-2025-30066 on
tj-actions/changed-files) runs inside the existing job context and exfiltrates whatever scope the workflow token holds via build logs. Withpermissions: {}the token has zero scope to leak; release authority lives only inDENOBOT_PAT.Matches the per-job permission style already used in this repo's hardened workflows. YAML validated locally with
yaml.safe_load.