[Aikido] Validate gpg.program paths to prevent arbitrary code execution - #47
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[Aikido] Validate gpg.program paths to prevent arbitrary code execution#47aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 2 commits into
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…ry code execution
Fall back to the platform GPG default when repository configuration is invalid and cover validation with deterministic cross-platform tests.
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This patch fixes an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in
src-tauri/src/commands/history.rswhere untrusted gpg.program configuration from repository-local Git settings could be executed without validation. The fix implements path validation to ensure GPG program paths are either absolute paths to existing files or simple program names resolvable on the system PATH before execution during commit signature verification. This prevents attackers from injecting malicious commands through crafted repository configurations.