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[Aikido] Prevent arbitrary code execution via repository-controlled gpg.program config - #46

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cst8t merged 2 commits into
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fix/aikido-security-code-audit-106592348-t8gw
Sep 5, 2026
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[Aikido] Prevent arbitrary code execution via repository-controlled gpg.program config#46
cst8t merged 2 commits into
mainfrom
fix/aikido-security-code-audit-106592348-t8gw

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@aikido-autofix aikido-autofix Bot commented Sep 5, 2026

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This patch addresses an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in src-tauri/src/commands/history.rs where the gpg.program configuration could be controlled by repository settings. The fix restricts GPG program resolution to global Git configuration only and validates that configured paths are either simple command names or existing absolute paths, rejecting relative paths that could reference repository-controlled executables. By adding a git_config_get_global method to the VerificationRunner trait, the application now prevents attackers from executing arbitrary code through malicious repository configurations.

aikido-autofix Bot and others added 2 commits September 5, 2026 17:42
Keep repository-local GPG configuration separate from the global test value so the security boundary is exercised consistently on Linux and Windows.
@cst8t
cst8t merged commit 734a8cf into main Sep 5, 2026
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