[pull] master from apache:master

.github/workflows/welcome-new-users.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ on:
 jobs:
   welcome:
     runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    if: github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR'
     permissions:
       pull-requests: write
 

AGENTS.md

@@ -52,6 +52,43 @@ Common pre-commit failures:
 - **External API exposure** - Use UUIDs in public APIs instead of internal integer IDs
 - **Existing models** - Add UUID fields alongside integer IDs for gradual migration
 
+## Security and Threat Model
+
+Before evaluating any code path for security issues, read [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). It is the canonical, authoritative source for Apache Superset's security model and is referenced by both human reporters and automated scanners.
+
+In short, the test for whether a finding is in scope is one question:
+
+> *Does it let a principal perform an action the role and capability matrix in `SECURITY.md` does not entitle them to?*
+
+If yes, it is in scope. If no, it is not.
+
+The three trust boundaries are:
+
+1. **The Admin role** is a fully trusted operational principal. Anything an Admin can do through documented configuration, API, or UI is an intended capability, not a vulnerability.
+2. **The operator** owns deployment-time decisions (secrets, network exposure, feature-flag selection, connector and codec choices, notification destinations, third-party plugins). Misconfiguration at this layer is a deployment defect, not a Superset vulnerability.
+3. **The codebase** is responsible for enforcing the role and capability matrix wherever it exposes functionality to a principal: API routes, command and DAO layers, UI handlers, background jobs, and any other entry point. A missing or incorrect enforcement check is in scope no matter where it lives.
+
+The security model assumes that operator-controlled infrastructure, including the metadata database, cache backends, message brokers, secret stores, and deployment environment, remains within the operator's trust boundary. Vulnerabilities must demonstrate a security boundary violation by an attacker who does not already control those systems.
+
+Route-level authorization in this codebase uses one of three Flask-AppBuilder decorators depending on the route type:
+
+- `@protect()` for REST API routes (`ModelRestApi` / `BaseApi`)
+- `@has_access_api` for legacy view routes
+- `@has_access` for legacy HTML view routes
+
+Object-level authorization via `security_manager.raise_for_access(...)` applies to data-bearing resources: dashboards, charts, datasets and datasources, queries, database and table access, and query contexts. Other resources (annotations, tags, CSS templates, reports, RLS rules, and similar) rely on the route-level decorator plus DAO `base_filters` for ownership scoping; the absence of `raise_for_access` on these resources is by design, not a finding. Code that omits the per-object gate on a route that returns or mutates a specific data-bearing object is in scope; code that follows the correct pattern for its resource class can still contain injection, SSRF, XSS, or other classes of finding unrelated to authorization, which are evaluated separately.
+
+The full role and capability matrix, in-scope and out-of-scope class lists, and CVE aggregation rules are in [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). Defer to that document for any specifics.
+
+**Requirements for findings filed by automated tooling**
+
+Automated scanners (LLM-based code scanners, static analyzers, dependency tools) that file findings against this codebase must, in each finding, name:
+
+1. The specific role and capability matrix row in [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) the finding believes is violated.
+2. The principal the finding assumes the attacker holds (Public, Gamma, sql_lab, Alpha, Admin, Embedded guest token, or a custom role with explicit capability grants).
+
+Findings that cannot identify both should be filed as questions, not vulnerabilities. This requirement exists to ensure every reported issue is testable against the published security model and to keep speculative or pattern-match-only reports out of the triage queue.
+
 ## Key Directories
 
 ```
@@ -128,6 +165,7 @@ The Developer Portal auto-generates MDX documentation from Storybook stories. **
 ## Architecture Patterns
 
 ### Security & Features
+- **Security model**: see the top-level [Security and Threat Model](#security-and-threat-model) section and [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)
 - **RBAC**: Role-based access via Flask-AppBuilder
 - **Feature flags**: Control feature rollouts
 - **Row-level security**: SQL-based data access control