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Security: SeCuReDmE-main-dev/FfeD-QLC-MVP

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

SecuredMe Education Governance Alignment

  • Current phase: pre-alpha / in development.
  • Repository license: Secured Educational Cybersecurity License 2.0 (SECL-2.0), local metadata reference LicenseRef-SECL-2.0.
  • Official AI-assisted classroom routes: Codex/OpenAI and Antigravity/Gemini only.
  • Do not add Ollama Cloud, uncensored local AI, raw-token student flows, or unknown agent providers as official school routes.
  • Cybersecurity, fraud-awareness, protection, or abuse-prevention behavior must stay defensive and supervised.
  • Preserve human-review boundaries; do not claim production, clinical, regulatory, enforcement, safety-critical, or autonomous authority readiness.
  • Private modified copies, broken forks, and unreviewed rewrites are not a maintainer support obligation.

Public MVP Boundary

This repository is public. Do not commit:

  • real .env files;
  • private API keys;
  • Datadog API keys;
  • E2B API keys;
  • private research notebooks;
  • sensitive datasets;
  • credentials, tokens, cookies, or session material.

Secret Handling Model

The MVP protects secrets by workflow separation:

  • public examples contain variable names, not values;
  • Docker labels and Datadog tags must not contain secrets;
  • sandbox runs should receive only the exact variables required;
  • logs should contain success/failure state, not raw secret material;
  • .env files are ignored by git.

Image And Screenshot Redaction

Images can contain secrets even when the filename looks harmless. Before images are committed, sent to a sandbox, or referenced in public documentation:

  • run object detection for sensitive regions such as screens, documents, QR codes, dashboards, and terminals;
  • run OCR and secret-pattern scanning on visible text;
  • use solid redaction for real keys and credentials;
  • emit only fingerprints, counts, and decision IDs to observability tools;
  • do not send unredacted screenshots to Datadog logs.

See docs/yolo-secret-redaction.md.

Optional Bouncy Castle Perimeter

The optional bcctl integration uses Bouncy Castle through an external local tool to sign public metadata digests. It is a perimeter integrity receipt for workflow bundles, not a replacement for the QLC structural transform, ChaCha20-Poly1305, scrypt key derivation, or future production threat modeling.

The provider boundary is strict:

  • pass only key IDs, context digests, artifact/message digests, and signature digests;
  • never pass raw files, plaintext, passphrases, API keys, .env values, private corpus text, screenshots, or raw simulator payloads;
  • keep provider failures sanitized and do not echo local filesystem paths in public status output;
  • leave normal QLC commands functional when bcctl is not configured.

See docs/bouncy-castle-perimeter.md.

Reporting

If you find a secret exposure or unsafe public artifact, open a private disclosure path with the repository owner instead of posting the secret in a public issue.

Current Limit

This MVP is not a production cryptographic system and is not yet a certified secret-management platform. Treat it as a public scaffold for building and testing the boundary layer.

There aren't any published security advisories