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Following @cygnusv's initial look at testnet decentralization.
Some risks of overcentralization that impact NuCypher service quality & network health:
- Collusion
Stakers might collude to compromise data privacy, to deny revocation, to game payout mechanisms, or to facilitate other (unknown) attacks. - Censorship
Blocking access to data by refusing to re-encrypt. This is hard to orchestrate – see nucypher/nucypher#803 - High threshold service discontinuation
For whatever reason, if a dominant staker or staker cartel decides to spin up the minimum number of workers (1), then users (and indeed, mechanisms) relying on a largenmay suffer. - Weakening of economic mechanisms (i.e. stake-based sybil resistance)
Across which planes should we measure and monitor the gini coefficient / lorenz curve? At least these four:
- Primary ownership of tokens
Fairly obvious, since reward allocation and job assignment are stake-weighted - Control of delegated tokens
Depending on governance rules, this could equate to the the political power @michwill mentioned - Total number of workers
More of a functional issue (i.e. are there enough workers to satisfy the threshold choices of users) – doesn't have much impact on censorship or power consolidation risks - Client diversity
Including dependency on underlying clients (i.e. Geth dominance)
The risks of overcentralization are also affected by:
- the reliability/security of the randomness with which stakers are selected for policies (initially and if user requests a worker re-shuffle)
- 'permanence of employment' - how long stakers are tied into (relatively) lucrative policies, during which they cannot be displaced
- liquidity and price of token: how feasible is it for a staker to join later and reduce a trend towards consolidation
- typical thresholds chosen by users
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