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Some things to work on in the near future:
- Encryption preconditions are syntactically burdensome. Try to have only 1 inductive?
- abstractions:
- "Weaken" auth_safe to allow an eqwhp rewrite. Prove that these versions are just as useful as the old versions.
- A helper function with interaction which outputs the set of old indices with respect to n, so that we can talk about terms being old wrt n. Prove:
- The set of old indices is monotonic in n
- Any index in (interaction n) is old wrt n
- The indices generated by interaction at time (n + 1) are new wrt n
- Our formulation of public-key encryption has some confusion about nonces. Resolve this after getting a good idea of symmetric-key encryption down.
- n-step protocols to work on:
- "kerberos" - trusted 3rd party which shares sym. keys with
everyone; repeatedly negotiates a shared key between 2 people
who use the shared key - build up towards TLS-like protocol:
- "PGP" - regularly sign encryption keys; people check the
signatures and send you messages - session keys (cf Hugo Krawczyk, SIGMA)
- multiple clients
- KEM/PKE/DH
- auth/confidentiality/both
- preshared keys (similar to ratcheting)
- key derivation
- "PGP" - regularly sign encryption keys; people check the
- ratcheting - each round, send a message and new encryption+mac keys
- could even show ratcheting property
- probably will have the most problems. not even really
handled well by computational models
- server which takes adv message, prepends with "adv said: ", signs;
wts all messages begin with "adv said: "- more or less superseded by "PGP"
- "kerberos" - trusted 3rd party which shares sym. keys with
- compositionality of indist:
if e, e' are independent from context C, then
e ≈ e' -> C[e] ≈ C[e'] - prove no_nonce_reuse
- x <> y -> whp $x != $y
andres-erbsen
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