[integrity] DIFC Integrity-Filtered Events Report — 2026-04-26 #28635
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This discussion was automatically closed because it expired on 2026-04-29T20:55:19.460Z.
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Executive Summary
In the last 7 days, 115 DIFC integrity-filtered events were detected across 22 workflow runs. The most frequently filtered tool was
list_issues(67 events), followed bysearch_issues(33) andpull_request_read(15). Every single filtered event was caused by an integrity violation — specifically, agents attempting to process GitHub resources (issues and PRs) with integrity tags ofnone:allorunapproved:all, which fall below the workflow's required trust threshold.The filtering is concentrated in two high-volume workflows: Sub-Issue Closer (57 events across 2 runs) and Dev (33 events across 2 runs). These workflows consistently encounter user-submitted content that hasn't been approved, which is expected behavior — the DIFC system is operating correctly by blocking agents from acting on unreviewed/untrusted input. The distribution across Apr 25 (53 events) and Apr 26 (62 events) shows a stable, consistent filtering rate with no anomalous spikes.
Key Metrics
none:all(115 events),unapproved:all(100 events)📈 Events Over Time
Events are concentrated on two days (Apr 25–26), the full extent of the 7-day window that contained activity. Volume increased slightly from 53 to 62 events (+17%) between the two days — this is driven primarily by Sub-Issue Closer and Dev workflow executions rather than a systematic escalation.
🔧 Top Filtered Tools
All three filtered tools (
list_issues,search_issues,pull_request_read) are GitHub MCP server tools. This is expected: workflows that process incoming issues and PRs will naturally encounter content taggednone:all(unreviewed by the integrity system) orunapproved:all(not yet approved). The filtering prevents agents from reading or acting on content from untrusted contributors without approval.🏷️ Filter Reasons and Tags
100% of filtered events are integrity-related (zero secrecy violations). The dominant tags are
none:all(all 115 events) andunapproved:all(100 events). These tags indicate that the triggering resources (GitHub issues and PRs) were created by contributors who have not yet been vetted — the integrity gate is functioning as designed.📋 Per-Workflow Breakdown
📋 Per-Server Breakdown
👤 Per-User Breakdown
🔍 Per-User Analysis
The per-user distribution is broad (45+ unique contributors) with no single user dominating. The leading individual contributor is yskopets (11 events), followed by danielmeppiel and shea-parkes (5 each). These are all human contributors whose issues or PRs triggered the Sub-Issue Closer or Design Decision Gate workflows before being approved. The 15 events listed as "unknown" correspond to
pull_request_readcalls where the triggering author login was not surfaced in the filtered event metadata. No automated bot accounts (e.g.,github-actions[bot]) appear in the filtered events, confirming that filtering is driven by human contributors submitting new content — expected behavior.💡 Tuning Recommendations
Sub-Issue Closer (57 events / 50% of total): This workflow calls
list_issuesin bulk on open issues across the repository. Consider adding an integrity pre-filter step to skip issues below theapprovedthreshold before calling the GitHub MCP tool, reducing noise and improving efficiency.Dev workflow (33 events): Review the workflow prompt to determine if it can narrow its
search_issuesscope to approved or member-authored issues only. Addingauthor_association: MEMBER,OWNER,COLLABORATORfiltering at the MCP query level would significantly reduce filtered events.unknownauthor logins (15 events / 13%): These appear inpull_request_readevents without author attribution. Confirm that the MCP server is returningauthor_loginfor PR resources; if not, this may be a gap in the gateway's event metadata collection.unapproved:alltag prevalence (100/115 events): This high rate is expected for a public repository with external contributors. If the approval queue grows, consider automating trust elevation for contributors with a track record (e.g., multiple merged PRs).No secrecy violations: The absence of secrecy-tagged filtering is positive — no workflow is inadvertently passing confidential data to tools that shouldn't see it. This baseline should be monitored daily; any appearance of secrecy violations would warrant immediate investigation.
Stable rate, no spike: With only 2 active days in the window and a modest day-over-day increase, there is no urgent action required. Continue monitoring daily to detect if any single workflow begins accumulating filtered events at an accelerating rate.
Generated by the Daily Integrity Analysis workflow
Analysis window: Last 7 days | Repository: github/gh-aw
Run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/24965818195
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