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feat: data URI and remote fetch (#4)
## What? Add support for `data:` URIs (base64) and `http(s)://` URLs as image sources, alongside existing local file paths. ## Why? Extends the ability of usage Signed-off-by: drew <me@andrinoff.com> Co-authored-by: Lea <lea@floatpane.com> Co-authored-by: Steve Evans <steve@floatpane.com>
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README.md

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## Features
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- **Auto-detected protocols** — Kitty, Sixel, half-block fallback. Works on any modern terminal.
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- **Multiple sources** — local files, `data:` URIs (base64), and `http(s)://` URLs.
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- **Sandboxed decoder** — image bytes parsed in an isolated subprocess with Landlock + seccomp on Linux.
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- **No CGO required for the consumer** — pure-Go API surface; the C decoder is contained in the worker subprocess.
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- **Terminal pixel detection** — sizes output to the actual cell pixel dimensions when available.
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}
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```
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### Sources
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The `src` argument accepts any of:
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```go
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termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "/path/to/cat.png", opts)
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termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "https://example.com/cat.png", opts)
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termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "...", opts)
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```
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Remote URLs and data URIs are fetched/decoded in the parent process, then handed
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to the sandboxed worker over stdin — the worker still runs with Landlock denying
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all filesystem access. Remote payloads are capped at 64 MiB.
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Use `DisplayContext` to pass a `context.Context` for cancellation of HTTP fetches
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and decoding.
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### Options
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| Field | Description |

docs/content/api.mdx

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## `termimage.Display`
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```go
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func Display(w io.Writer, path string, opts Options) error
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func Display(w io.Writer, src string, opts Options) error
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```
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Decodes the image at `path` and writes terminal graphics to `w`. Returns the
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first error encountered (file open, decode, or render failure).
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Decodes the image at `src` and writes terminal graphics to `w`. `src` may be:
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- a local file path (`/path/to/cat.png`)
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- an `http(s)://` URL
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- a `data:` URI with a base64 payload (`data:image/png;base64,...`)
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Remote URLs and data URIs are fetched/decoded in the parent process, then
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piped to the sandboxed worker over stdin. Payloads are capped at **64 MiB**.
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Returns the first error encountered (fetch, decode, or render failure).
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## `termimage.DisplayContext`
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```go
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func DisplayContext(ctx context.Context, w io.Writer, src string, opts Options) error
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```
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Same as `Display` but takes a `context.Context` for cancellation of HTTP
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fetches and sandboxed decoding.
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## `termimage.Options`
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| `decode` | CGo stb_image binding. `decode.File(path)` and `decode.Bytes(data)` |
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| `detect` | Protocol detection. `detect.Best()` |
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| `render` | `render.Kitty`, `render.Sixel`, `render.HalfBlock` |
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| `sandbox` | Subprocess worker. `sandbox.Decode(path)` |
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| `sandbox` | Subprocess worker. `sandbox.Decode(path)`, `sandbox.DecodeBytes(data)` |
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| `internal/source` | Source resolver. Branches file path / `data:` URI / `http(s)://` URL |
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| `internal/resize` | `resize.Fit(img, maxW, maxH)` — BiLinear scale |

docs/content/getting-started.mdx

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MaxHeight: 1080,
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})
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```
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## Remote images and data URIs
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`Display` accepts any of these as `src`:
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```go
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// Local file
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termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "/path/to/cat.png", opts)
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// Remote URL
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termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "https://example.com/cat.png", opts)
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// Data URI (base64 only)
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termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "...", opts)
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```
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Remote URLs are fetched in the parent process; payloads cap at 64 MiB. The
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sandboxed worker still runs — bytes are piped to it over stdin with Landlock
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denying all filesystem access.
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For cancellable fetches, use `DisplayContext`:
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```go
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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termimage.DisplayContext(ctx, os.Stdout, url, opts)
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```

docs/content/introduction.mdx

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- **Three render modes** — Kitty graphics, DEC Sixel, Unicode half-block
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fallback. Auto-detected from environment.
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- **Multiple sources** — local files, `data:` URIs (base64), and `http(s)://`
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URLs. Remote payloads capped at 64 MiB.
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- **CGo decode via stb_image** — single-header C library compiled with `-O3`.
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Significantly faster than Go's stdlib `image` package for large JPEG/PNG.
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- **Subprocess sandbox** — decode runs in an isolated child process with
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Landlock filesystem restriction (read-only access to the target file only).
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Seccomp allowlist is upcoming.
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Landlock filesystem restriction (read-only access to the target file only,
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or full lockdown for remote/data sources). Seccomp allowlist is upcoming.
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- **Zero forced dependencies** — Kitty and half-block use only stdlib. Sixel
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quantization is pure Go median-cut. The sandbox uses `golang.org/x/sys`.
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docs/content/sandbox.mdx

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When `Sandboxed: true`:
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1. The parent process spawns `os.Executable()` as a subprocess with
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`TERMIMAGE_WORKER=1` and `TERMIMAGE_WORKER_PATH=<path>` in the environment.
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2. The child calls `MaybeRunWorker()`, which detects the env var and takes
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1. The parent resolves the source (file / `data:` URI / `http(s)://` URL).
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Remote fetches and base64 decode happen here, **outside** the sandbox.
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2. The parent spawns `os.Executable()` as a subprocess with `TERMIMAGE_WORKER=1`
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and `TERMIMAGE_WORKER_MODE=path|stdin` in the environment. For path mode
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it also sets `TERMIMAGE_WORKER_PATH=<path>`; for stdin mode it pipes the
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bytes to the child's stdin.
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3. The child calls `MaybeRunWorker()`, which detects the env var and takes
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over.
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3. **Before opening the file**, the child applies OS restrictions.
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4. The child reads, decodes, and writes raw RGBA pixels (`width[4] + height[4]
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+ pixels`) to stdout.
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5. The parent reads the pixel data over the pipe and renders it.
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4. **Before touching any input**, the child applies OS restrictions.
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5. The child decodes and writes raw RGBA pixels (`width[4] + height[4] +
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pixels`) to stdout.
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6. The parent reads the pixel data over the pipe and renders it.
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> [!CAUTION]
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> The sandboxed child re-execs **your binary**, not a dedicated helper. If your
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## Landlock (Linux ≥5.13)
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Landlock restricts filesystem access to the target file only, read-only:
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In **path mode** (local file), Landlock restricts filesystem access to the
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target file only, read-only:
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```go
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landlock.V3.BestEffort().RestrictPaths(landlock.ROFiles(path))
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```
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In **stdin mode** (remote URL / data URI), no file access is needed — the
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worker reads bytes from the pipe — so Landlock is configured with no granted
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paths, denying all filesystem access:
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```go
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landlock.V3.BestEffort().RestrictPaths() // empty = deny-all
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```
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`BestEffort()` silently degrades on older kernels — the binary still runs, just
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without Landlock protection.
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> [!NOTE]
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> Network access for remote URLs happens **in the parent**, before the
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> sandboxed child is spawned. The child itself never gets to make network
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> calls — the bytes are already in memory by the time it starts.
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## Seccomp (upcoming)
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A syscall allowlist via BPF is in progress. The allowlist must accommodate the

internal/source/source.go

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// Package source resolves image sources: file paths, data URIs, and remote URLs.
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package source
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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)
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// Kind tags how the source should be loaded.
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type Kind int
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const (
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KindFile Kind = iota
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KindBytes
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)
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// Resolved is the resolver result. Exactly one of Path or Bytes is set.
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type Resolved struct {
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Kind Kind
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Path string // when Kind == KindFile
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Bytes []byte // when Kind == KindBytes
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}
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// MaxRemoteBytes caps remote/data URI payloads to prevent OOM on hostile servers.
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const MaxRemoteBytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024
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// Resolve inspects src and returns either a file path or pre-loaded bytes.
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// HTTP(S) URLs and data: URIs are fetched/decoded here; everything else is
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// treated as a file path.
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func Resolve(ctx context.Context, src string) (*Resolved, error) {
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if strings.HasPrefix(src, "data:") {
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b, err := decodeDataURI(src)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &Resolved{Kind: KindBytes, Bytes: b}, nil
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}
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if u, err := url.Parse(src); err == nil && (u.Scheme == "http" || u.Scheme == "https") {
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b, err := fetch(ctx, src)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &Resolved{Kind: KindBytes, Bytes: b}, nil
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}
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return &Resolved{Kind: KindFile, Path: src}, nil
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}
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// decodeDataURI parses RFC 2397 data: URIs. Only base64-encoded payloads are
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// supported (the common form for images); plain percent-encoded payloads are
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// rejected — callers wanting that should pre-decode.
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func decodeDataURI(s string) ([]byte, error) {
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rest := strings.TrimPrefix(s, "data:")
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comma := strings.IndexByte(rest, ',')
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if comma < 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: missing comma")
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}
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meta, payload := rest[:comma], rest[comma+1:]
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if !strings.Contains(meta, "base64") {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: only base64 payloads supported")
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}
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b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: base64 decode: %w", err)
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}
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if len(b) > MaxRemoteBytes {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: payload exceeds %d bytes", MaxRemoteBytes)
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}
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return b, nil
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}
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func fetch(ctx context.Context, rawURL string) ([]byte, error) {
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: build request: %w", err)
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}
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: fetch: %w", err)
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}
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defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
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if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
89+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: HTTP %s", resp.Status)
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}
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b, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxRemoteBytes+1))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: read body: %w", err)
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}
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if len(b) > MaxRemoteBytes {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: response exceeds %d bytes", MaxRemoteBytes)
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}
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return b, nil
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}

internal/source/source_test.go

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package source
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
8+
"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestResolve_File(t *testing.T) {
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r, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "/tmp/cat.png")
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if err != nil {
15+
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
16+
}
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if r.Kind != KindFile {
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t.Errorf("Kind = %v, want KindFile", r.Kind)
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}
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if r.Path != "/tmp/cat.png" {
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t.Errorf("Path = %q", r.Path)
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}
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}
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func TestResolve_DataURI(t *testing.T) {
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payload := []byte("hello-bytes")
27+
uri := "data:image/png;base64," + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
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r, err := Resolve(context.Background(), uri)
29+
if err != nil {
30+
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
31+
}
32+
if r.Kind != KindBytes {
33+
t.Fatalf("Kind = %v, want KindBytes", r.Kind)
34+
}
35+
if string(r.Bytes) != string(payload) {
36+
t.Errorf("Bytes mismatch: %q", r.Bytes)
37+
}
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}
39+
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func TestResolve_DataURI_RejectsNonBase64(t *testing.T) {
41+
_, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "data:text/plain,hello")
42+
if err == nil {
43+
t.Error("expected error for non-base64 data URI")
44+
}
45+
}
46+
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func TestResolve_DataURI_BadBase64(t *testing.T) {
48+
_, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "data:image/png;base64,!!!not-base64!!!")
49+
if err == nil {
50+
t.Error("expected error for invalid base64")
51+
}
52+
}
53+
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func TestResolve_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
55+
body := []byte("pretend-png-bytes")
56+
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
57+
_, _ = w.Write(body)
58+
}))
59+
defer srv.Close()
60+
61+
r, err := Resolve(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/x.png")
62+
if err != nil {
63+
t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
64+
}
65+
if r.Kind != KindBytes {
66+
t.Fatalf("Kind = %v, want KindBytes", r.Kind)
67+
}
68+
if string(r.Bytes) != string(body) {
69+
t.Errorf("body mismatch: %q", r.Bytes)
70+
}
71+
}
72+
73+
func TestResolve_HTTP_NonOK(t *testing.T) {
74+
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
75+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
76+
}))
77+
defer srv.Close()
78+
79+
_, err := Resolve(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/missing.png")
80+
if err == nil {
81+
t.Error("expected error for HTTP 404")
82+
}
83+
if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "404") {
84+
t.Errorf("error should mention status: %v", err)
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}
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}

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