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Publish authorized attack-surface management discovery and evidence workflows #20

Description

@szmyty

Outcome

Publish reusable Attack Surface Management (ASM) workflows that continuously inventory Ego Hygiene-owned public exposure, detect drift, and produce actionable evidence without turning organization discovery into unauthorized scanning of third parties.

Architecture

canonical owned asset inventory
        +
approved discovery sources
        ↓
Relay ASM discovery/verification
        ↓
observed domains / services / public endpoints
        ↓
reconciliation + drift + ownership state
        ↓
private details + safe Observatory summary

The canonical ownership inventory remains outside scanner output; observations reconcile against declared ownership rather than becoming truth automatically.

Scope

Support authorized discovery and monitoring of assets such as:

  • organization/product domains and subdomains;
  • GitHub Pages/custom-domain deployments;
  • public application origins;
  • documented APIs/endpoints;
  • public package/container registries where relevant;
  • certificates/TLS identities;
  • DNS records;
  • externally reachable services explicitly within scope.

Safety and authorization

  • Maintain explicit organization-owned/authorized scope.
  • Passive discovery may identify unknown candidates, but candidates must not automatically become active-scan targets.
  • Never expand scope from third-party DNS/CDN/SaaS relationships into infrastructure not owned or authorized by Ego Hygiene.
  • Respect rate limits and provider terms.
  • Default to passive or low-impact verification.
  • Require separate explicit approval before any intrusive service testing; DAST/penetration-testing behavior belongs in the appropriate profile.
  • Avoid publishing sensitive topology, origin addresses, exploitable ports, or vulnerability details.

Discovery sources and adapters

Evaluate maintained, reproducible sources/tools for:

  • declared repository/site manifests;
  • DNS and certificate transparency observations;
  • GitHub Pages/custom domains;
  • approved cloud/deployment inventory where connected;
  • HTTP/TLS reachability and metadata;
  • other passive public observations.

Adapters must identify source, timestamp, confidence, and collection method. Do not rely on a single opaque vendor as the canonical inventory.

Reconciliation model

Classify observed assets as, for example:

  • declared and observed;
  • declared but unavailable;
  • newly observed / needs ownership review;
  • deprecated but still exposed;
  • redirected/moved;
  • third-party dependency;
  • unauthorized/out-of-scope candidate;
  • unknown;
  • stale observation.

Detect meaningful drift such as:

  • unexpected new subdomain;
  • expired or changed certificate;
  • old deployment still reachable;
  • DNS record that no longer matches declared architecture;
  • public service that lacks an owning repository/product;
  • site expected to exist but unavailable.

Evidence and reporting

  • Produce durable machine-readable inventory snapshots and diffs.
  • Preserve source/provenance and observation times.
  • Make high-risk details available only to authorized maintainers.
  • Emit safe aggregate posture/freshness data for egohygiene/observatory#4.
  • Support scheduled execution and manual verification.
  • Fail visibly when discovery sources/tools are unavailable rather than presenting stale data as current.

Acceptance criteria

  • Relay exposes a versioned ASM discovery/reconciliation workflow.
  • Active scope comes from explicit declared ownership/authorization.
  • Passive unknown discoveries require review before becoming scan targets.
  • Third-party provider infrastructure is excluded unless separately authorized.
  • Inventory snapshots preserve provenance, confidence, and observation time.
  • Drift between declared and observed exposure is reported.
  • Deprecated-but-still-live and unknown assets are visible.
  • Detailed potentially exploitable topology remains non-public.
  • A safe aggregate summary can feed Observatory/Trust Center.
  • Scheduled and manual modes are documented and tested.

Dependencies / related

Non-goals

  • Unauthorized internet-wide scanning.
  • Treating every discovered third-party service as an Ego Hygiene asset.
  • Replacing a canonical repository/domain inventory with scanner observations.
  • Publishing detailed external attack-surface data to the public Trust Center.

Activity

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