Enable OIDC per-publish review

[paulmillr]

This part of blog post:

OIDC trusted-publisher binding has no per-publish review. Once configured, any code path in the workflow can mint a publish-capable token. We need either (a) move to short-lived classic tokens with manual review, or (b) add provenance-source-verification to detect publishes from unexpected workflow steps

Could easily be solved:

• On NPM, in pkg settings, limit publish to one environment (e.g. publish)
• On GitHub, create publish env. Then require maintainers review before publish

Demo: https://github.com/alcuadrado/trusted-publishing-example

Complete minimal reproducer

https://example.com

[AdnaneKhan]

This is really, really important.

Otherwise, anyone with write access to this repo can repeat the same supply chain attack.

These days you must assume a single developer will have their GitHub account compromised and be resilient against that single point of failure.

[paulmillr]

Not sure why this issue isn't prioritized or even commented at

[schiller-manuel]

rest assured we look into this