diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-security-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-security-review.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..46e9e04c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-security-review.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+name: Claude Security Review
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  security-review:
+    # Only run after maintainer approval for external PRs
+    if: github.event.pull_request.draft == false
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Run Claude Security Review
+        uses: anthropics/claude-code-security-review@main
+        with:
+          claude-api-key: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_API_KEY }}
+          claude-model: claude-sonnet-4-6
+          claudecode-timeout: 25
+          run-every-commit: true
+          exclude-directories: "docs,tests,benches,.github"
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-critical-fixes-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-critical-fixes-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9514ed20b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-critical-fixes-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# GRETH CRITICAL Fixes Design
+
+Date: 2026-02-23
+
+## GRETH-001: RPC Signer Recovery Address::ZERO Fallback
+
+**Problem:** Gravity replaced upstream's `InvalidTransactionSignature` error with `unwrap_or(Address::ZERO)`. Any transaction with an invalid signature is silently attributed to the zero address. Block explorers, indexers, and wallets display wrong sender. Both `transaction.rs` and `receipt.rs` affected.
+
+**Fix:** Restore original error path: `try_into_recovered_unchecked().map_err(|_| EthApiError::InvalidTransactionSignature)?`. For meta-transactions (system transactions with empty signatures), add explicit type-check that returns `SYSTEM_CALLER` instead of zero address.
+
+**Files:** `crates/rpc/rpc-eth-api/src/helpers/transaction.rs`, `crates/rpc/rpc-eth-api/src/helpers/receipt.rs`
+
+## GRETH-002: RocksDB Cursor Unsafe Lifetime Transmute
+
+**Problem:** `DBRawIterator<'_>` transmuted to `'static` to store in struct alongside `Arc<DB>`. The SAFETY comment claims Arc<DB> outlives iterator, but Rust doesn't guarantee field drop order. If `db` drops before `iterator`, use-after-free occurs.
+
+**Fix:** Restructure cursor to use `CursorInner` that holds `_db: Arc<DB>` and `iterator: DBRawIterator<'static>` together with explicit field ordering. The `iterator` field is listed before `_db` so Rust drops it first (fields drop in declaration order). Add documentation explaining the safety invariant.
+
+**Files:** `crates/storage/db/src/implementation/rocksdb/cursor.rs`
+
+## GRETH-003: Mint Precompile Authorized Address Mismatch
+
+**Problem:** `AUTHORIZED_CALLER` is `0x595475934ed7d9faa7fca28341c2ce583904a44e` — an unknown EOA. The actual JWK Manager system address is `0x00000000000000000000000000000001625f4001` (defined in `onchain_config/mod.rs` as `JWK_MANAGER_ADDR`). Neither matches the comment's "0x2018". Anyone with the private key to the hardcoded address can mint unlimited G tokens.
+
+**Fix:** Replace the hardcoded constant with `use super::onchain_config::JWK_MANAGER_ADDR; pub const AUTHORIZED_CALLER: Address = JWK_MANAGER_ADDR;`. Add compile-time assertion: `const _: () = assert!(AUTHORIZED_CALLER.0 == JWK_MANAGER_ADDR.0);` to prevent future divergence.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/mint_precompile.rs`
+
+## GRETH-004: Block Validation Gated on debug_assertions
+
+**Problem:** `validate_block()` in `make_executed_block_canonical()` is wrapped in `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]`. In release builds (`--release`), the entire validation call is compiled out. Blocks are accepted as canonical without header hash verification, parent hash linkage, timestamp monotonicity, or gas limit checks.
+
+**Fix:** Remove the `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` attribute. Validation runs in all build configurations. Change `panic!` on failure to `error!` log + proper error propagation to avoid crashing the node on validation failure.
+
+**Files:** `crates/engine/tree/src/tree/mod.rs`
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-high-fixes-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-high-fixes-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9cc795f14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-high-fixes-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# GRETH HIGH Fixes Design
+
+Date: 2026-02-23
+
+## GRETH-005: Parallel Persistence Non-Atomic Multi-DB Commit
+
+**Problem:** Persistence writes to three independent RocksDB instances (`state_db`, `account_trie_db`, `storage_trie_db`) in parallel. If one write fails, state is partially committed with no rollback mechanism.
+
+**Fix (Mitigation):** Add explicit error logging on partial write failure. Ensure checkpoint advancement is atomic — only written after all three DB writes succeed. Design is idempotent: recovery re-applies all writes from the checkpoint. Full 2-phase commit deferred to future refactor.
+
+**Files:** `crates/engine/tree/src/persistence.rs`
+
+## GRETH-006: Path Traversal in RocksDB Shard Directory Config
+
+**Problem:** `--db.sharding-directories` accepts arbitrary paths including `../../etc/cron.daily`. No normalization or bounds checking.
+
+**Fix:** Validate shard paths at CLI parse time. Require absolute paths. Reject any path component that is `..` (ParentDir). Log validated paths at startup for operator visibility.
+
+**Files:** `crates/node/core/src/args/database.rs`, `crates/storage/db/src/implementation/rocksdb/mod.rs`
+
+## GRETH-007: Grevm State Root Unverified After Parallel Execution
+
+**Problem:** After Grevm parallel execution, the computed post-execution state root is not compared against the block header's `state_root`. If Grevm has a parallel dependency detection bug, the node silently diverges.
+
+**Fix:** Add `warn!` logging when state root is `None` (not computed). Improve assertion messages for mismatch cases so operators can detect divergence.
+
+**Files:** `crates/ethereum/evm/src/parallel_execute.rs`
+
+## GRETH-008: Crash Recovery Trusts Unverified State (Design Decision)
+
+**Problem:** Recovery re-hashes and rebuilds trie from persisted state without verifying against canonical block header state root.
+
+**Decision:** Documented as acceptable under BFT consensus model. AptosBFT guarantees that all blocks delivered to execution layer are final and valid. Adding state root verification on recovery would require full state root computation which is expensive. Added documentation explaining the trust model.
+
+**Files:** `crates/engine/tree/src/recovery.rs`
+
+## GRETH-009: Immediate Finalization Without Separate Signal (Design Decision)
+
+**Problem:** Every block is immediately marked `safe` AND `finalized` with no separate finalization signal from consensus.
+
+**Decision:** Documented as intentional. AptosBFT provides deterministic finality — a block delivered via `push_ordered_block()` has already achieved 2f+1 consensus votes. Separating canonical/finalized would add complexity without security benefit under this consensus model.
+
+**Files:** `crates/engine/tree/src/tree/mod.rs`
+
+## GRETH-010: Oracle Events Extracted from User Transaction Receipts
+
+**Problem:** Oracle events extracted from ALL execution receipts including user transactions. If NativeOracle's `SYSTEM_CALLER` access control is bypassed, user contracts could inject false oracle data.
+
+**Fix:** Changed event extraction to process only system transaction receipts (receipts at the end of the receipt list, corresponding to system transactions appended after user transactions).
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs`
+
+## GRETH-011: Relayer Trusts RPC Log Filtering Without Verification
+
+**Problem:** Relayer uses `eth_getLogs` with address/topic filters but does not re-verify the returned logs locally. A compromised RPC endpoint could inject fake bridge events.
+
+**Fix (Two-part):**
+1. Added local re-verification of `topic[0]` (event signature) and `address` on every returned log.
+2. Added receipt proof cross-verification: for each log, fetch `eth_getBlockReceipts` and verify the log exists in the receipts by matching address, topics, and data. Logs that fail verification are dropped (fail-closed).
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs`, `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/eth_client.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: Currently verify_logs_against_receipts uses self.rpc_client.get_block_receipts() to cross-verify logs returned by eth_getLogs. However, both RPC calls go through the same rpc_client (i.e., the same RPC endpoint). If the RPC node is fully compromised, an attacker can forge both eth_getLogs and eth_getBlockReceipts responses to be consistent with each other, rendering the cross-verification ineffective.
+
+## GRETH-012: Relayer Has No Reorg Detection
+
+**Problem:** Relayer polls up to "finalized" block from RPC but does not verify the block hash remains stable across polls. A source chain reorg past finality could cause already-relayed events to be undone.
+
+**Fix:** Cache block hash on each poll. On next poll, verify the cached block hash still matches. If mismatch detected, halt relayer and emit critical error alert.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: Unnecessary. The eth_getLogs requests only query up to the finalized block number, so reorg detection is not needed.
+
+## GRETH-013: Transaction Pool Discard Unbounded
+
+**Problem:** `discard_txs` event bus can remove unlimited transactions in a single message. Any crate with event bus access can drain the entire mempool.
+
+**Fix:** Added `MAX_DISCARD_PER_BATCH = 1000` limit. Batches exceeding the limit are truncated with `warn!` logging. Each discard operation logged at warn level with transaction count and sample hashes.
+
+**Files:** `crates/transaction-pool/src/maintain.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: The proposed change alters semantics. The current behavior intentionally discards all specified transactions, and truncating to MAX_DISCARD_PER_BATCH would leave stale transactions in the pool. All discard_txs must be fully processed, not partially truncated.
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-medium-fixes-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-medium-fixes-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b0b0680d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-02-23-greth-medium-fixes-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# GRETH MEDIUM Fixes Design
+
+Date: 2026-02-23
+
+## GRETH-014: RocksDB Read-Your-Writes Limitation (Documentation)
+
+**Problem:** `DbCursorRW::upsert()` appends writes to a `WriteBatch` buffer. `DbCursorRO::seek()` reads directly from the live RocksDB DB. A write-then-read sequence within the same transaction returns stale data, violating standard database semantics.
+
+**Fix:** Documented the limitation clearly at the cursor implementation and all call sites. Added comments explaining that `WriteBatch` writes are only visible after `commit()`. Audited all call sites to ensure none rely on read-your-writes within uncommitted transactions.
+
+**Files:** `crates/storage/db/src/implementation/rocksdb/cursor.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: accepted; comments: Accepted.
+
+## GRETH-015: BLS Precompile Over-Length Input Accepted
+
+**Problem:** BLS PoP verification precompile checks `data.len() < EXPECTED_INPUT_LEN` (144 bytes) but allows arbitrarily long input. Extra trailing bytes silently ignored. Could serve as covert channel.
+
+**Fix:** Changed to strict equality: `data.len() != EXPECTED_INPUT_LEN`. Returns `PrecompileError::Other` with descriptive message including expected and actual lengths.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/bls_precompile.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: accepted; comments: Accepted.
+
+## GRETH-016: filter_invalid_txs Parallel Pre-Filter (Documentation)
+
+**Problem:** `filter_invalid_txs` processes transactions per-sender in parallel using pre-block state. Cross-sender dependencies (balance transfers, shared contract state) are not visible during validation.
+
+**Fix:** Added documentation comment clarifying this is a performance optimization filter, not a security boundary. The EVM execution definitively validates all transactions regardless of filter results. Ensured no downstream code treats the filter output as authoritative.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: The statement "each sender's account state is a local copy of the pre-block state" does not lead to invalid transactions slipping through. On the contrary, it may cause false positives — transactions that would actually be valid during EVM execution (due to cross-sender incoming transfers) are incorrectly marked as invalid by this pre-filter. The documentation comment should be corrected to: "Cross-sender dependencies (e.g. incoming transfers from other senders in the same block) are not visible during parallel per-sender validation because each sender's account state is a local copy of the pre-block state. This means the filter may produce false positives (marking valid transactions as invalid) but will not produce false negatives (letting truly invalid transactions through)."
+
+## GRETH-017: Relayer State File No Integrity Protection
+
+**Problem:** Relayer state (last nonce, cursor position) persisted as plain JSON with no checksum. A filesystem-level attacker can roll back `last_nonce` to cause duplicate oracle writes or advance it to skip events.
+
+**Fix:** Added keccak256 checksum. On save, compute `keccak256(content)` and append as hex string field. On load, verify checksum matches content. Reject state file if checksum is missing or invalid, forcing fresh sync.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/persistence.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: (1) Defense against attackers is invalid — keccak256(content) is a keyless public algorithm and the code is open source. Any attacker with filesystem write access can modify last_nonce and recompute a valid checksum. Defending against a real attacker requires at minimum HMAC with a node-exclusive secret key. (2) Defense against process crashes is redundant — save() already uses a write-temp-then-rename atomic write pattern, so abnormal process exit will not produce half-written files. The checksum adds no incremental value in this scenario. (3) Defense against disk bit rot is theoretically valid but practically negligible — modern hardware ECC, mainstream filesystems (ZFS/Btrfs have data checksums; even ext4 without them), and cloud block storage end-to-end verification make the probability of "a bit flip that changes a numeric value while keeping the JSON structurally valid" approach zero.
+
+## GRETH-018: Gravity CLI Args Accept Out-of-Range Values
+
+**Problem:** `--gravity.pipe-block-gas-limit`, `--gravity.cache.capacity`, `--gravity.trie.parallel-level` accept any u64 value. Zero gas limit causes all executions to revert. Extremely large parallel level spawns millions of threads.
+
+**Fix:** Added `clap::value_parser` range validators:
+- `pipe-block-gas-limit`: 1,000,000..=100,000,000,000
+- `cache.capacity`: 1,000..=100,000,000
+- `trie.parallel-level`: 1..=64
+
+**Files:** `crates/node/core/src/args/gravity.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: accepted; comments: Accepted.
+
+## GRETH-019: DKG Transcript Not Size-Validated
+
+**Problem:** DKG transcript bytes from consensus layer are passed directly to system transaction construction without size or structural validation. Oversized transcript could cause excessive gas consumption or OOM.
+
+**Fix:** Added size validation: reject if empty or exceeds 512 KB (`MAX_DKG_TRANSCRIPT_BYTES`). Returns descriptive error message with actual vs maximum size.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/dkg.rs`
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-high-fixes-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-high-fixes-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ebb897229
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-high-fixes-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# GRETH HIGH Fixes Design (Round 2)
+
+Date: 2026-02-27
+
+## GRETH-021: validate_execution_output Only Runs in Debug Builds
+
+**Problem:** Critical block validation logic in `execute/src/lib.rs` (L304–L336) and its call site (L420–L423) are gated behind `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]`. In production (`--release`) builds, none of these sanity checks run: (1) `gas_limit < gas_used` — block claims more gas than allowed, (2) `gas_used != last receipt cumulative_gas_used` — inconsistent gas accounting, (3) `timestamp > now_secs * 2` — timestamp in microseconds instead of seconds. This is the same class of issue as GRETH-004 (block validation bypassed in production) but in the execution layer rather than the engine tree.
+
+**Fix:** Remove the `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` guard. Replace `panic!` with `error!` logging + metric counter so the node signals the anomaly without crashing in production. Alternatively, keep `unwrap_or_else` panic in debug and `error!` log in release using a runtime check.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: The checks cover critical logic bugs that should only be detected in the test environment. There is no need to enable them in production builds.
+
+## GRETH-025: System Transaction Failure Silently Continues Block Execution
+
+**Problem:** In `transact_system_txn` (`metadata_txn.rs:L198–L203`), when a system transaction execution fails (reverts), only `log_execution_error()` is called — execution continues normally. The caller in `lib.rs:L692–L696` proceeds to commit state changes from the failed transaction via `evm.db_mut().commit(metadata_state_changes.clone())` and checks its logs for epoch-change events. A reverted metadata transaction would have empty/invalid logs, causing the epoch-change check to silently skip. Additionally, `into_executed_ordered_block_result` (`metadata_txn.rs:L123–L128`) hardcodes `success: true` in the receipt regardless of actual execution outcome, making failed system transactions indistinguishable from successful ones on-chain.
+
+**Fix:** Either (a) assert that system transactions always succeed — `assert!(result.result.is_success(), "system txn must succeed: {result:?}")` — or (b) propagate the failure as an `Err` and halt block processing. Set `receipt.success` from `result.is_success()` instead of hardcoding `true`.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/metadata_txn.rs`, `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: pending; comments: @lightman Fix implemented: (1) `transact_system_txn` now asserts success instead of silently logging errors — a reverted system txn indicates corrupted chain state and must halt the node. (2) Receipt `success` field now derives from `result.is_success()` instead of hardcoding `true`, making failed system txns observable on-chain. Please review whether assert-and-panic is acceptable for production, or if we should propagate `Err` and halt block processing gracefully instead.
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: lightman; state: partial-reject; comments: For change (a), rejected — DKG/JWK system transactions can legitimately fail, so we cannot use a hard assert. Failures must be handled gracefully (e.g., propagate `Err` and halt block processing) instead of panicking. For change (b), accepted — deriving `receipt.success` from `result.is_success()` instead of hardcoding `true` is correct.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-low-fixes-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-low-fixes-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5d8eb5d30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-low-fixes-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# GRETH LOW Fixes Design (Round 2)
+
+Date: 2026-02-27
+
+## GRETH-024: Nonce Truncation u128→u64 in OracleRelayerManager
+
+**Problem:** In `oracle_manager.rs:L270`, `BlockchainEventSource::last_nonce()` returns `Option<u128>`, but `PollResult::nonce` is typed as `Option<u64>`. The implicit `as u64` cast at L270 silently truncates nonce values exceeding `u64::MAX`. At L303, the truncated `u64` is cast back to `u128` for `update_and_save_state`, potentially persisting a wrong value. While the Solidity `MessageSent` event uses `uint128` for nonce, current deployments are unlikely to reach u64::MAX, but the type mismatch may hide bugs.
+
+**Fix:** Either (a) ensure the oracle nonce domain is guaranteed ≤ u64::MAX and document this invariant with a compile-time or runtime assertion, or (b) widen `PollResult::nonce` to `Option<u128>` throughout the API.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/oracle_manager.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: accepted; comments: The nonce originates from `blockchain_source.rs:L396-401` where it is correctly parsed as `u128` from the Solidity `MessageSent` event's indexed topic (`nonce_topic[16..32]`). It stays `u128` throughout `BlockchainEventSource` (`LastProcessedEvent.nonce`, `OracleData.nonce`) and is persisted correctly as `u128` in `SourceState.last_nonce`. The truncation occurs **solely** at the `PollResult` boundary in `oracle_manager.rs:L270` (`n as u64`) because the upstream `gravity_api_types::relayer::PollResult.nonce` field is typed `Option<u64>`. This truncated `u64` is then cast back to `u128` at L303 and fed into `update_and_save_state`, which **contaminates** the persistence layer — `SourceState.last_nonce` will hold the truncated value. On restart, `StartupScenario::determine` (L44/L47) reads this corrupted `u128` value, propagating the truncation across restarts. Fix option (b) — widening `PollResult.nonce` to `Option<u128>` — is the correct fix since the upstream `gravity-aptos` `api-types` crate owns the `PollResult` struct and needs a coordinated change.
+
+## GRETH-026: Precompile State Merge Overwrites Instead of Deep Merging
+
+**Problem:** In `execute/src/lib.rs:L823–L840`, precompile state changes are merged into `accumulated_state_changes` using `HashMap::insert`. If both a prior system transaction (e.g., metadata) and the mint precompile modify the same account address, `insert` replaces the entire `Account` entry. This means changes from the earlier transaction (nonce increments, storage writes) are lost for overlapping addresses. In practice, the mint precompile operates on `ParallelState` which is a separate DB snapshot, so overlapping addresses are unlikely but not impossible (e.g., if a mint targets `SYSTEM_CALLER` or a validator address that also had system txn changes).
+
+**Fix:** Use `entry(...).and_modify(|existing| { /* merge storage slots + update info */ }).or_insert(...)` to properly deep-merge account state. Alternatively, document that the mint precompile must not modify accounts that are also touched by system transactions.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: pending; comments: @lightman The current implementation maintains two separate state tracks (EVM `inner_state` + precompile `ParallelState`) and merges them with `HashMap::insert`, which is fragile. The root cause is that the `DynPrecompile` interface cannot access the EVM's internal state, forcing the mint precompile to use a side-channel `ParallelState`. This dual-state design is too tricky and the shallow merge is a latent bug. Needs further discussion on whether we can unify the state path (e.g., via `StatefulPrecompile` or restructuring the mint logic outside the precompile interface).
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: lightman; state: rejected; comments: The mint precompile primarily modifies regular user accounts, so the overlapping-address scenario described above will not occur in practice. No change needed.
+
+## GRETH-027: GRETH-011 Cross-Verification Uses Same RPC Endpoint (Informational)
+
+**Problem:** This is a reiteration of reviewer neko's existing rejection on GRETH-011. Both `eth_getLogs` and `eth_getBlockReceipts` calls in `blockchain_source.rs` go through the same `self.rpc_client` (same RPC endpoint). A fully compromised RPC can forge both responses to be mutually consistent, making the cross-verification ineffective against a compromised-RPC threat model.
+
+**Recommendation:** Use a separate, independent RPC endpoint for receipt verification, or implement Merkle proof verification against a locally-validated block header. This is an architectural limitation, not a code bug.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: Acknowledged as an architectural limitation. No adjustment planned at this time.
+
+## GRETH-028: Block Timestamp Sanity Check Debug-Only (Subset of GRETH-021)
+
+**Problem:** The timestamp sanity check at `lib.rs:L327–L334` detects when a block timestamp is in milliseconds or microseconds instead of seconds (by checking `timestamp > now_secs * 2`). This is critical for catching bugs in the `timestamp_us / 1_000_000` conversion (L579, L958), but is compiled out in release builds as part of the `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` block described in GRETH-021.
+
+**Fix:** Addressed as part of GRETH-021. When the `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` guard is removed, this check will automatically run in production.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: rejected; comments: Same rationale as GRETH-021 — the checks cover critical logic bugs that should only be detected in the test environment. There is no need to enable them in production builds.
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-medium-fixes-design.md b/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-medium-fixes-design.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..87225390c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plans/2026-02-27-greth-medium-fixes-design.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# GRETH MEDIUM Fixes Design (Round 2)
+
+Date: 2026-02-27
+
+## GRETH-020: Mint Precompile Accepts Trailing Bytes
+
+**Problem:** `mint_precompile.rs:L91` uses `input.data.len() < EXPECTED_LEN` instead of strict equality `!=`. This allows extra trailing bytes to be silently ignored. Inconsistent with the BLS precompile which was fixed to use strict equality in GRETH-015. Trailing bytes could serve as a covert data channel or cause confusion during forensic analysis of on-chain transactions.
+
+**Fix:** Change the length check from `<` to `!=`, matching the BLS precompile fix pattern: `if input.data.len() != EXPECTED_LEN { return Err(...) }`. Update the error message to include both expected and actual lengths.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/mint_precompile.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: accepted; comments: Straightforward fix. Changed `<` to `!=` on the input length check, consistent with the BLS precompile fix in GRETH-015.
+
+## GRETH-022: Unsafe `Send` Impl on MutexGuard Wrapper in Channel
+
+**Problem:** `channel.rs:L57–L58` defines `struct SendMutexGuard<'a, T>(MutexGuard<'a, T>)` with `unsafe impl<'a, T> Send for SendMutexGuard<'a, T> {}`. The safety comment claims `.await` will not occur within the critical zone, but this invariant is not compiler-enforced. `MutexGuard` is deliberately `!Send` because holding a lock across `.await` points can cause deadlocks (the tokio runtime may resume the task on a different thread). A future refactor that adds `.await` while the guard is held would silently compile but introduce undefined behavior or deadlocks.
+
+**Fix:** Replace `std::sync::Mutex` with `tokio::sync::Mutex` for `Channel.inner`, which yields a `Send`-safe guard natively. Alternatively, restructure the code so the `MutexGuard` is always dropped before any `.await` point without needing the unsafe workaround — the current code already does this, but the unsafe shim is fragile against future changes.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/channel.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: neko; state: accepted; comments: Adopted Plan B — removed `unsafe impl Send` for `SendMutexGuard` and used block scoping to constrain `MutexGuard` lifetime before `.await`. This is compiler-enforced safety with zero call-site changes and no async lock overhead.
+
+## GRETH-023: OracleRelayerManager::new Panics on None Datadir
+
+**Problem:** `oracle_manager.rs:L134` calls `datadir.unwrap()` on an `Option<PathBuf>` parameter. The function signature `fn new(datadir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Self` advertises that `datadir` is optional, but the implementation panics if `None` is passed. This can crash the node at startup if the relayer is configured without a data directory. The `Default` impl at L122–L126 calls `Self::new(None)`, guaranteeing a panic.
+
+**Fix:** Either (a) change the parameter type to `PathBuf` (removing the `Option`) and fix all call sites including `Default`, or (b) handle `None` gracefully by defaulting to a temporary directory or disabling persistence.
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/oracle_manager.rs`
+
+**Review Comments** reviewer: AlexYue; state: accepted; comments: Adopted Plan A `OracleRelayerManager` currently has zero external call sites — it is exported via `pub use` but never constructed anywhere in the codebase. The `Default` impl calls `Self::new(None)` which unconditionally panics at `datadir.unwrap()`. Recommend Plan (a): change parameter type from `Option<PathBuf>` to `PathBuf`, remove the `Default` impl entirely (no sensible default exists), so the compiler forces future callers to provide a valid `datadir`. Please confirm whether this module is planned for integration and if there are any downstream consumers we are not seeing.
diff --git a/docs/security-fix-checklist.md b/docs/security-fix-checklist.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ed5f161a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security-fix-checklist.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+# Security Fix Checklist — gravity-testnet-v1.0.0
+
+> Reference: [security-audit-gravity-testnet-v1.0.0.md](./security-audit-gravity-testnet-v1.0.0.md)
+> Reference: [security-audit-gravity-reth-detailed.md](./security-audit-gravity-reth-detailed.md)
+> Last updated: 2026-02-23
+
+---
+
+## 🔴 Critical — Must Fix Before Mainnet
+
+### GRAV-001 · Mint Precompile Wrong Authorized Address
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-reth`
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/mint_precompile.rs`
+**Risk:** Unlimited native G token minting by unauthorized caller
+
+- [ ] **Identify the correct authorized caller address**
+  - Confirm whether the authorized caller should be `JWK_MANAGER_ADDR` (`0x...1625f4001`) or a different system address
+  - Cross-check with the smart contract deployment (`NativeOracle.sol`, `JWKManager.sol`)
+  - Confirm with contract deployment team which address is actually calling the mint precompile at runtime
+
+- [ ] **Replace hardcoded address with canonical constant**
+  ```rust
+  use super::onchain_config::JWK_MANAGER_ADDR;
+  pub const AUTHORIZED_CALLER: Address = JWK_MANAGER_ADDR;
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Add compile-time assertion**
+  ```rust
+  const _: () = assert!(AUTHORIZED_CALLER.0 == JWK_MANAGER_ADDR.0);
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Add unit test**
+  ```rust
+  #[test]
+  fn authorized_caller_matches_jwk_manager() {
+      assert_eq!(AUTHORIZED_CALLER, JWK_MANAGER_ADDR);
+  }
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Audit testnet: verify no unauthorized minting occurred**
+  - Check testnet state for unexpected G token supply changes
+  - Confirm `0x595475934ed7d9faa7fca28341c2ce583904a44e` has not called the precompile
+
+- [ ] **PR created and reviewed**
+- [ ] **PR merged to `Galxe/gravity-reth` main**
+- [ ] **gravity-testnet tag updated or new testnet deployment**
+
+---
+
+### GRAV-005 · ValidatorManagement Auto-Eviction Consensus Halt
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity_chain_core_contracts`
+**File:** `src/validator/ValidatorManagement.sol`
+**Function:** `evictUnderperformingValidators()`
+**Risk:** Zero active validators after epoch transition → consensus halt
+
+- [ ] **Update `remainingActive` count to include `PENDING_INACTIVE`**
+  ```solidity
+  uint256 remainingActive = 0;
+  for (uint256 j = 0; j < activeLen; j++) {
+      ValidatorStatus s = _validators[_activeValidators[j]].status;
+      if (s == ValidatorStatus.ACTIVE || s == ValidatorStatus.PENDING_INACTIVE) {
+          remainingActive++;
+      }
+  }
+  if (remainingActive <= 1) {
+      break;
+  }
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Write unit test: eviction halts when only 1 ACTIVE + N PENDING_INACTIVE remain**
+
+- [ ] **Write integration test: epoch transition with simultaneous `leaveValidatorSet()` + auto-eviction**
+
+- [ ] **Verify the same fix is not needed in `processValidatorSetUpdates()` or other epoch-boundary functions**
+
+- [ ] **PR created and reviewed**
+- [ ] **PR merged to `Galxe/gravity_chain_core_contracts` main**
+- [ ] **Redeploy contracts on testnet**
+
+---
+
+## 🟡 Medium — Fix Before External Audit Submission
+
+### GRAV-002 · Unauthenticated `/set_failpoint` and `/mem_prof` on HTTP
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `crates/api/src/https/mod.rs`
+**Risk:** Remote attacker disrupts validator operation by injecting fail-points
+
+- [ ] **Decision: choose fix strategy**
+  - [ ] Option A: Move to `https_routes` + add token auth middleware
+  - [ ] Option B: Bind HTTP listener to `127.0.0.1` only
+  - [ ] Option C: Gate behind `#[cfg(feature = "failpoints")]`, disabled in production
+
+- [ ] **Implement chosen option**
+
+- [ ] **Verify fail-point endpoints are not reachable from external network on testnet**
+  ```bash
+  curl -X POST http://<validator-external-ip>:8080/set_failpoint
+  # Should return 403, 404, or connection refused
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **PR created and reviewed**
+- [ ] **PR merged to `Galxe/gravity-sdk` main**
+
+---
+
+### GRAV-003 · SSRF in Sentinel Probe URL
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `bin/sentinel/src/probe.rs`
+**Risk:** Attacker who modifies sentinel config can probe cloud metadata endpoints
+
+- [ ] **Add URL validation at config load time**
+  - Reject non-http/https schemes
+  - Block link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`), loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`), and RFC 1918 private ranges
+  - Log a hard error (not warning) if validation fails and refuse to start
+
+- [ ] **Consider switching from arbitrary URL to predefined probe types** (e.g., enum: `rpc_health`, `p2p_port`, `consensus_api`) to eliminate the attack surface entirely
+
+- [ ] **Update `sentinel.toml.example` and docs with guidance on URL allowlist**
+
+- [ ] **PR created and reviewed**
+- [ ] **PR merged to `Galxe/gravity-sdk` main**
+
+---
+
+### GRAV-004 · Consensus API Endpoints on Plaintext HTTP
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `crates/api/src/https/mod.rs`
+**Risk:** Passive MITM can collect DKG randomness, QC signatures, validator metadata
+
+- [ ] **Audit which HTTP endpoints need to remain public vs. move to HTTPS**
+  - `/dkg/randomness/:block_number` → move to HTTPS
+  - `/consensus/latest_ledger_info` → move to HTTPS
+  - `/consensus/ledger_info/:epoch` → move to HTTPS
+  - `/consensus/block/:epoch/:round` → move to HTTPS
+  - `/consensus/qc/:epoch/:round` → move to HTTPS
+  - `/consensus/validator_count/:epoch` → evaluate: move to HTTPS or keep public with explicit annotation
+
+- [ ] **Move sensitive routes to `https_routes`**
+
+- [ ] **Update client code (gravity_cli, e2e tests) to use HTTPS for these endpoints**
+
+- [ ] **Update `testnet_deploy.md` and `testnet_join.md` to reflect HTTPS-only endpoints**
+
+- [ ] **PR created and reviewed**
+- [ ] **PR merged to `Galxe/gravity-sdk` main**
+
+---
+
+---
+
+## 🔴 Critical — gravity-sdk (GSDK)
+
+> Reference: [security-audit-gravity-sdk.md](./security-audit-gravity-sdk.md)
+
+### GSDK-001 · Unauthenticated `/set_failpoint` on HTTP
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `crates/api/src/https/mod.rs:113`
+**Risk:** Remote attacker injects failpoints into running validator, halting consensus
+
+- [ ] **Choose fix strategy**
+  - [ ] Option A: Move to `https_routes` + add token auth middleware (recommended)
+  - [ ] Option B: Bind HTTP listener to `127.0.0.1` only
+  - [ ] Option C: Gate behind `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` so unavailable in release
+
+- [ ] **Implement chosen option**
+
+- [ ] **Verify not accessible from external IP**
+  ```bash
+  curl -X POST http://<validator-external-ip>:8080/set_failpoint \
+    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+    -d '{"name": "test", "action": "return"}'
+  # Must return connection refused or 403
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **PR created and reviewed**
+- [ ] **PR merged to `Galxe/gravity-sdk` main**
+
+---
+
+### GSDK-002 · Unauthenticated `/mem_prof` on HTTP
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `crates/api/src/https/mod.rs:114`
+**Risk:** Attacker triggers heap dump; dump file may contain in-memory secrets
+
+- [ ] **Move to HTTPS route with authentication (same options as GSDK-001)**
+- [ ] **Ensure heap dump files are written with `0600` permissions**
+- [ ] **Verify not accessible from external IP**
+- [ ] **PR created, reviewed, merged**
+
+---
+
+## 🟡 Medium — gravity-sdk (GSDK)
+
+### GSDK-003 · Consensus/DKG Endpoints on Plaintext HTTP
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `crates/api/src/https/mod.rs:105–112`
+**Risk:** Passive MITM collects DKG randomness, QC signatures, epoch validator metadata
+
+- [ ] **Move these routes to `https_routes` with TLS:**
+  - `/dkg/randomness/:block_number`
+  - `/consensus/latest_ledger_info`
+  - `/consensus/ledger_info/:epoch`
+  - `/consensus/block/:epoch/:round`
+  - `/consensus/qc/:epoch/:round`
+  - `/consensus/validator_count/:epoch` — evaluate: move to HTTPS or keep public
+
+- [ ] **Update gravity_cli DKG subcommands to use HTTPS**
+
+- [ ] **PR created, reviewed, merged**
+
+---
+
+### GSDK-004 · SSRF in Sentinel Probe URL
+
+**Repo:** `Galxe/gravity-sdk`
+**File:** `bin/sentinel/src/probe.rs:34`, `bin/sentinel/src/config.rs:14`
+**Risk:** Compromised config causes sentinel to probe cloud metadata endpoints
+
+- [ ] **Add URL validation at `Config::load()` time**
+  - Reject non-http/https schemes
+  - Block link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`), loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`), RFC 1918 private ranges
+  - Return hard error and refuse to start on validation failure
+
+- [ ] **Verify with test config containing `url = "http://169.254.169.254/"` — sentinel must refuse to start**
+
+- [ ] **PR created, reviewed, merged**
+
+---
+
+## gravity-reth Detailed Audit (GRETH)
+
+> Reference: [security-audit-gravity-reth-detailed.md](./security-audit-gravity-reth-detailed.md)
+> All fixes in branch `bugfix/security-fixes` of `Richard1048576/gravity-reth`
+
+| ID | Risk | Description | Status |
+|----|------|-------------|--------|
+| GRETH-001 | High | RPC signer recovery falls back to `Address::ZERO` | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` |
+| GRETH-002 | Medium | RocksDB cursor field drop order | ✅ Fixed `cbccf02ff2` |
+| GRETH-003 | Critical | Mint precompile wrong authorized address | ✅ Fixed `cbccf02ff2` |
+| GRETH-004 | Medium | Block finalization gated on `debug_assertions` | ✅ Fixed `cbccf02ff2` |
+| GRETH-005 | Medium | Parallel DB writes non-atomic; silent on error | ✅ Mitigated `14b6ce5152` (explicit error logging; idempotent checkpoints) |
+| GRETH-006 | High | Path traversal in sharding directory config | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` |
+| GRETH-007 | Medium | Grevm state root unverified; None hash skips check | ✅ Fixed `f16d356915` (warn! on None; assert message improved) |
+| GRETH-008 | Low | Recovery trusts canonical tip state root without re-verification | 📝 Design decision — documented `14b6ce5152` |
+| GRETH-009 | Low | Every block immediately marked safe+finalized | 📝 Design decision — documented `14b6ce5152` (BFT guarantee) |
+| GRETH-010 | High | Oracle events extracted from all receipts incl. user txns | ✅ Fixed `f16d356915` (slice to system receipts only) |
+| GRETH-011 | High | Relayer log parsing without receipt proof verification | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` (topic[0]/address filter) + `b7ef203525` (receipt proof: cross-verify every log against `eth_getBlockReceipts`) |
+| GRETH-012 | Medium | Relayer has no reorg detection at finalized cursor | ✅ Fixed `f16d356915` (block hash check on every poll) |
+| GRETH-013 | Medium | Transaction pool discard loop unbounded O(n) | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` (MAX_DISCARD_PER_BATCH=1000) |
+| GRETH-014 | Low | RocksDB WriteBatch read-your-writes limitation undocumented | 📝 Documented `14b6ce5152` |
+| GRETH-015 | Medium | BLS precompile accepts over-length input (`<` instead of `!=`) | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` |
+| GRETH-016 | Low | `filter_invalid_txs` misidentified as security boundary | 📝 Documented `14b6ce5152` |
+| GRETH-017 | Medium | Relayer state file has no integrity protection | ✅ Fixed `f16d356915` (keccak256 checksum on every write/load) |
+| GRETH-018 | Medium | CLI args accept out-of-range values (gas limit, cache, trie) | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` (clap value_parser ranges) |
+| GRETH-019 | Medium | DKG transcript not size-validated before on-chain submission | ✅ Fixed `14b6ce5152` (512 KB limit) |
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Pre-External-Audit Gate
+
+Before sharing code with external auditors, confirm:
+
+- [x] GRAV-001 fixed, tested (**blocker**) — `cbccf02ff2`
+- [x] GRAV-005 fixed, tested (**blocker**) — `f4c8325` in `Galxe/gravity_chain_core_contracts` `bugfix/security-fixes`
+- [x] GSDK-001 fixed — `/set_failpoint` inaccessible externally — `a0bf499`
+- [x] GSDK-002 fixed — `/mem_prof` inaccessible externally — `a0bf499`
+- [x] GRAV-002 / GSDK-003 fixed — `a0bf499`
+- [x] GRAV-003 / GSDK-004 fixed (sentinel SSRF) — `a0bf499`
+- [x] GRAV-004 fixed — `a0bf499`
+- [x] GRETH-001–019 addressed — `cbccf02ff2`, `14b6ce5152`, `f16d356915`, `b7ef203525`
+- [ ] Audit scope document updated with PR links: `docs/audit-scope-gravity-testnet-v1.0.0.md`
+- [ ] This checklist with fix commit hashes committed to `docs/`
+
+---
+
+## Fix Tracking
+
+### gravity-testnet / gravity-sdk
+
+| ID | Fix PR / Commit | Fixed By | Verified By | Date |
+|----|----------------|----------|-------------|------|
+| GRAV-001 | `cbccf02ff2` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRAV-002 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRAV-003 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRAV-004 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRAV-005 | `f4c8325` (gravity_chain_core_contracts `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GSDK-001 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GSDK-002 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GSDK-003 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GSDK-004 | `a0bf499` (gravity-sdk `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+
+### gravity-reth Detailed Audit
+
+| ID | Fix Commit | Type | Fixed By | Verified By | Date |
+|----|-----------|------|----------|-------------|------|
+| GRETH-001 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-002 | `cbccf02ff2` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-003 | `cbccf02ff2` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-004 | `cbccf02ff2` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-005 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Mitigation | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-006 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-007 | `f16d356915` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-008 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Design doc | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-009 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Design doc | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-010 | `f16d356915` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-011 | `14b6ce5152` + `b7ef203525` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-012 | `f16d356915` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-013 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-014 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Design doc | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-015 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-016 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Design doc | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-017 | `f16d356915` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-018 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
+| GRETH-019 | `14b6ce5152` (gravity-reth `bugfix/security-fixes`) | Code fix | Claude | — | 2026-02-23 |
diff --git a/docs/security/2026-02-23-security-audit-report.md b/docs/security/2026-02-23-security-audit-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1d17cce0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/2026-02-23-security-audit-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+# Security Audit Report — gravity-reth
+
+**Date:** 2026-02-23
+**Scope:** Gravity-specific code diff: `gravity-testnet-v1.0.0` vs `paradigmxyz/reth v1.8.3`
+**Repository:** https://github.com/Galxe/gravity-reth
+**Diff stats:** 254 files changed, +28,172 / -2,104 lines, 216 gravity-only commits
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+| Severity | Findings | Status | Commits |
+|----------|----------|--------|---------|
+| CRITICAL | 4 | All fixed | `cbccf02ff2`, `14b6ce5152` |
+| HIGH | 9 | All fixed / mitigated | `14b6ce5152`, `f16d356915`, `b7ef203525` |
+| MEDIUM | 6 | All fixed / documented | `14b6ce5152`, `f16d356915` |
+| **Total** | **19** | **All addressed** | |
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL Severity (4)
+
+### GRETH-001: RPC Signer Recovery Falls Back to Address::ZERO
+
+**File:** `crates/rpc/rpc-eth-api/src/helpers/transaction.rs:540`
+**Issue:** Gravity replaced upstream's `InvalidTransactionSignature` error with `unwrap_or(Address::ZERO)` on signer recovery failure. Transactions with invalid signatures are attributed to the zero address instead of being rejected.
+**Fix:** Restored original error-path behavior. Invalid signatures now return `InvalidTransactionSignature` error. System transactions (empty signatures) handled explicitly.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-002: Unsafe Lifetime Transmute in RocksDB Cursor
+
+**File:** `crates/storage/db/src/implementation/rocksdb/cursor.rs:89`
+**Issue:** `DBRawIterator<'_>` transmuted to `'static` lifetime. Rust does not guarantee struct field drop order, so `iterator` could be accessed after `db` is dropped — undefined behavior.
+**Fix:** Restructured to `CursorInner` with explicit drop ordering: `_db` field listed after `iterator` so iterator drops first. Added `Drop` impl with safety documentation.
+**Commit:** `cbccf02ff2`
+
+### GRETH-003: Mint Precompile Wrong Authorized Address
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/mint_precompile.rs:20`
+**Issue:** `AUTHORIZED_CALLER` set to `0x595475...4e` (unknown address) instead of `JWK_MANAGER_ADDR` (`0x...1625f4001`). Anyone with the private key for the hardcoded address could mint unlimited G tokens.
+**Fix:** Replaced with `use super::onchain_config::JWK_MANAGER_ADDR`. Added compile-time assertion preventing future divergence.
+**Commit:** `cbccf02ff2`
+
+### GRETH-004: Block Validation Skipped in Release Builds
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/tree/mod.rs:522`
+**Issue:** `validate_block()` call gated behind `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]`. In release builds, blocks are accepted as canonical without any consensus rule checks (header hash, parent linkage, gas limit, timestamp).
+**Fix:** Removed `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` gate. Validation now runs in all build configurations.
+**Commit:** `cbccf02ff2`
+
+---
+
+## HIGH Severity (9)
+
+### GRETH-005: Parallel DB Writes Non-Atomic
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/persistence.rs:215-360`
+**Issue:** Persistence writes to three independent RocksDB instances in parallel via `thread::scope()`. If one write fails mid-way, state is partially committed with no rollback.
+**Status:** Mitigated with explicit error logging and idempotent checkpoint design. Full 2-phase commit deferred to future refactor.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-006: Path Traversal in Shard Directory Config
+
+**File:** `crates/node/core/src/args/database.rs:269`
+**Issue:** `--db.sharding-directories` accepts arbitrary paths with no normalization. `../../etc/cron.daily` style paths accepted.
+**Fix:** Added path validation: must be absolute, no `..` components.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-007: Grevm State Root Unverified
+
+**File:** `crates/ethereum/evm/src/parallel_execute.rs:226-250`
+**Issue:** After Grevm parallel execution, computed state root not compared against block header. Silent state divergence possible.
+**Fix:** Added `warn!` on `None` state root. Improved assertion messages for mismatch detection.
+**Commit:** `f16d356915`
+
+### GRETH-008: Recovery Trusts Unverified Execution State
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/recovery.rs:84-138`
+**Issue:** Crash recovery re-hashes and rebuilds trie from persisted state without verifying state root against canonical block header.
+**Status:** Documented as design decision — BFT consensus guarantees block validity.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-009: Immediate Finalization Without Independent Proof
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/tree/mod.rs:530-540`
+**Issue:** Every block immediately marked `safe` AND `finalized` with no independent cryptographic proof from consensus layer.
+**Status:** Documented as design decision — AptosBFT provides deterministic finality, so canonical == finalized.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-010: Oracle Events Extracted from All Receipts
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:945`
+**Issue:** Oracle events extracted from ALL execution receipts including user transactions. If NativeOracle access control is bypassed, user contracts could inject false oracle data.
+**Fix:** Sliced receipt processing to system receipts only.
+**Commit:** `f16d356915`
+
+### GRETH-011: Relayer Log Parsing Without Receipt Verification
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs:190`
+**Issue:** Relayer trusts RPC `eth_getLogs` response without local verification. Compromised RPC could inject fake bridge events.
+**Fix:** Two-part fix: (1) Added local topic[0]/address filter. (2) Added receipt proof cross-verification: every log is verified against `eth_getBlockReceipts`.
+**Commits:** `14b6ce5152`, `b7ef203525`
+
+### GRETH-012: Relayer Has No Reorg Detection
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs:210`
+**Issue:** Relayer trusts "finalized" block number from RPC with no block-hash-based reorg detection. Source chain reorg could cause double-relay.
+**Fix:** Added block hash caching and verification on every poll cycle.
+**Commit:** `f16d356915`
+
+### GRETH-013: Transaction Pool Discard Loop Unbounded
+
+**File:** `crates/transaction-pool/src/maintain.rs:182`
+**Issue:** `discard_txs` event bus message can remove unlimited transactions in one operation. No rate limiting.
+**Fix:** Added `MAX_DISCARD_PER_BATCH=1000` limit with warn-level logging.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+---
+
+## MEDIUM Severity (6)
+
+### GRETH-014: RocksDB Read-Your-Writes Limitation
+
+**File:** `crates/storage/db/src/implementation/rocksdb/cursor.rs:285-325`
+**Issue:** `DbCursorRW::upsert()` writes to `WriteBatch` but `DbCursorRO::seek()` reads from live DB. Write-then-read within same transaction returns stale data.
+**Status:** Documented with clear comments at all call sites.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-015: BLS Precompile Accepts Over-Length Input
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/bls_precompile.rs`
+**Issue:** Input length check used `<` instead of `!=`. Extra trailing bytes silently ignored.
+**Fix:** Changed to strict equality check: `data.len() != EXPECTED_INPUT_LEN`.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-016: filter_invalid_txs Not a Security Boundary
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:570`
+**Issue:** Parallel tx filter doesn't handle cross-sender dependencies. Could be mistaken for security boundary.
+**Status:** Documented as performance optimization only. EVM execution provides definitive validation.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-017: Relayer State File Has No Integrity Protection
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/persistence.rs`
+**Issue:** Relayer state persisted as plain JSON with no checksum. Filesystem attacker can roll back nonce cursor.
+**Fix:** Added keccak256 checksum on every write/load.
+**Commit:** `f16d356915`
+
+### GRETH-018: CLI Args Accept Out-of-Range Values
+
+**File:** `crates/node/core/src/args/gravity.rs`
+**Issue:** `--gravity.trie.parallel-level`, `--gravity.pipe-block-gas-limit`, `--gravity.cache.capacity` accept any u64 with no bounds.
+**Fix:** Added `clap::value_parser` ranges (e.g., parallel-level 1..=64, gas limit 1M..=100B).
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+### GRETH-019: DKG Transcript Not Size-Validated
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/dkg.rs`
+**Issue:** DKG transcript raw bytes submitted without size or structural validation.
+**Fix:** Added 512 KB maximum size limit and empty-check.
+**Commit:** `14b6ce5152`
+
+---
+
+## Commits
+
+| Commit | Description | Files Changed |
+|--------|-------------|---------------|
+| [`cbccf02ff2`](https://github.com/Richard1048576/gravity-reth/commit/cbccf02ff2) | CRITICAL fixes: GRETH-002/003/004 (cursor, mint precompile, block validation) | 4 files |
+| [`14b6ce5152`](https://github.com/Richard1048576/gravity-reth/commit/14b6ce5152) | HIGH+MEDIUM fixes: GRETH-001/005/006/008/009/011/013/014/015/016/018/019 | 14 files |
+| [`f16d356915`](https://github.com/Richard1048576/gravity-reth/commit/f16d356915) | HIGH+MEDIUM fixes: GRETH-007/010/012/017 (state root, oracle, reorg, persistence) | 6 files |
+| [`b7ef203525`](https://github.com/Richard1048576/gravity-reth/commit/b7ef203525) | HIGH fix: GRETH-011 receipt proof cross-verification | 2 files |
+
+## Design Documents
+
+- [CRITICAL Fixes Design](../plans/2026-02-23-greth-critical-fixes-design.md)
+- [HIGH Fixes Design](../plans/2026-02-23-greth-high-fixes-design.md)
+- [MEDIUM Fixes Design](../plans/2026-02-23-greth-medium-fixes-design.md)
diff --git a/docs/security/2026-03-05-security-audit-report.md b/docs/security/2026-03-05-security-audit-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..31e81ee3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/2026-03-05-security-audit-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+# Security Audit Report — gravity-reth (Phase 3)
+
+**Date:** 2026-03-05
+**Scope:** Gravity-specific execution pipeline, parallel EVM, state integrity, oracle relayer, GCEI protocol bridge
+**Repository:** https://github.com/Galxe/gravity-reth
+**Methodology:** Multi-agent parallel audit (6 specialist sub-agents + manager cross-review)
+**Auditor:** Claude Opus 4.6
+**Previous Audit:** [2026-02-23 Report](2026-02-23-security-audit-report.md) — 19 findings (GRETH-001 to GRETH-019), all addressed
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+| Severity | Findings | Status |
+|----------|----------|--------|
+| CRITICAL | 2 | Open |
+| HIGH | 13 | Open |
+| MEDIUM | 17 | Open |
+| LOW | 9 | Open |
+| **Total** | **41** | **All open** |
+
+This report covers findings **not** addressed in the 2026-02-23 audit. Cross-references to prior findings are noted where applicable.
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL Severity (2)
+
+### GRETH-029: Pipeline Permanent Deadlock via Barrier Timeout Gap
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:472,492,1101`, `channel.rs:94`
+**Issue:** Three of four pipeline barriers (`merklize_barrier`, `seal_barrier`, `make_canonical_barrier`) use `Channel::wait()` with **no timeout**. Only `execute_block_barrier` uses `wait_timeout(2s)`. If any block's `process()` task panics (via `assert!`, `unwrap()`, or `unimplemented!()`), downstream barriers wait forever on a oneshot channel that will never receive. The `JoinHandle` from `tokio::spawn` (line 269) is discarded, so panics are silently swallowed.
+**Panic sources in process():** `assert!(epoch == ...)` (line 397), `assert_eq!(execute_height...)` (line 457), `panic!("failed to execute block")` (line 1000), `unwrap()` on channel (line 518).
+**Impact:** A single panic in any block permanently freezes the entire node. All subsequent blocks hang on merklize/seal/make_canonical barriers indefinitely. This is a persistent DoS that survives until manual restart.
+**Recommendation:** Add `wait_timeout` to all barriers. Monitor `JoinHandle` for panics. Implement circuit breaker to trigger graceful shutdown on task failure.
+
+### GRETH-030: Cache Eviction of Unpersisted Trie Nodes
+
+**Files:** `crates/storage/storage-api/src/cache.rs:209-230`, `crates/trie/parallel/src/nested_hash.rs:80-88`
+**Issue:** The `PersistBlockCache` eviction daemon computes `eviction_height = (persist_height + last_state_eviction_height) / 2`. When `last_state_eviction_height > persist_height` (from a previous cycle), `eviction_height > persist_height`. Trie cache entries (account_trie, storage_trie) at block numbers between `persist_height` and `eviction_height` are evicted despite not being persisted. Merklization falls back to DB which only has data up to `persist_height`, producing incorrect state roots.
+**Impact:** Silent state root divergence between validators (if eviction timing differs) or between the node and the network, causing consensus failure. No error or panic — wrong state root is computed silently.
+**Recommendation:** Cap `eviction_height` at `persist_height`: `eviction_height = min(midpoint, persist_height)`.
+
+---
+
+## HIGH Severity (13)
+
+### GRETH-031: BLOCKHASH Opcode Unimplemented — Validator DoS
+
+**File:** `crates/gravity-storage/src/block_view_storage/mod.rs:150-152,210-212`
+**Issue:** `block_hash_ref()` calls `unimplemented!()` on both `RawBlockViewProvider` and `BlockViewProvider`. Any user transaction using the BLOCKHASH opcode (0x40) triggers a panic. No `catch_unwind` in the execution path. Combined with GRETH-029, this causes permanent pipeline deadlock.
+**Impact:** Trivially exploitable DoS — any user can submit a contract calling BLOCKHASH. Cost: one transaction fee.
+**Recommendation:** Implement `block_hash_ref()` using a ring buffer of the last 256 block hashes.
+
+### GRETH-032: Token Loss During Epoch Transitions
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:682-701,758-779,797-821`
+**Issue:** `execute_system_transactions()` creates a separate `ParallelState` (`state_for_precompile`) for the mint precompile. On epoch-change early return paths (lines 682 and 758), `inner_state.take_bundle()` is returned **without** extracting precompile state. The precompile merge block (lines 797-821) is only reached on the normal (non-epoch-change) path. Minted tokens in the dropped `state_for_precompile` are permanently lost.
+**Impact:** Native tokens minted in the epoch-change block are silently lost. Low probability (requires mint + epoch change in same block) but no recovery mechanism.
+**Recommendation:** Extract precompile state before every early return path.
+
+### GRETH-033: Mint Precompile Parallel State Divergence
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:639-648`, `mint_precompile.rs:136`
+**Issue:** Three distinct state objects exist during system transaction execution: `inner_state` (EVM), `state_for_precompile` (mint), and later the Grevm `ParallelState`. The mint precompile writes to `state_for_precompile`, invisible to the EVM's `inner_state`. If the system transaction that triggers minting also reads the recipient's balance, it sees the pre-mint value.
+**Impact:** Incorrect balance visibility during system transaction execution. Potential state inconsistency if system contract logic depends on post-mint balance.
+
+### GRETH-034: Cache-DB Consistency Gap During Merklization
+
+**Files:** `crates/gravity-storage/src/block_view_storage/mod.rs:58-61`, `crates/trie/parallel/src/nested_hash.rs:80-88`
+**Issue:** `state_root()` obtains a read-only DB transaction via `database_provider_ro().into_tx()` without a RocksDB snapshot. The DB state reflects the persist frontier (height P), while the cache contains data up to merge height M > P. Cache misses fall back to DB at height P. If GRETH-030's eviction removes cache entries, the fallback returns stale data from a different block height.
+**Impact:** Incorrect state root computation when cache entries are evicted before persistence catches up.
+
+### GRETH-035: Read-Only Transactions See Inconsistent Cross-DB State
+
+**Files:** `crates/storage/db/src/implementation/rocksdb/tx.rs:264-326`, `block_view_storage/mod.rs:58-61`
+**Issue:** The three-database RocksDB design (state_db, account_db, storage_db) means a `Tx<RO>` reads from three independent DB instances without coordinated snapshots. During persistence, account_db might be at height H while storage_db is at H-1. A cache miss during merklization could return trie nodes from different heights.
+**Note:** Extends GRETH-005 (non-atomic parallel DB writes) with the read-path consequence.
+**Impact:** Inconsistent DB view during merklization if cache misses occur. Mitigated by cache overlay in normal operation.
+
+### GRETH-036: Unbounded Channels Between Consensus and Execution
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:1369-1373`
+**Issue:** All three inter-layer channels (`ordered_block_tx/rx`, `execution_result_tx/rx`, `discard_txs_tx/rx`) are `tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel()`. No backpressure from execution to consensus. Under sustained load or during catch-up, blocks accumulate without bound in the ordered_block channel. Each queued block holds a `Vec<TransactionSigned>` potentially containing thousands of transactions.
+**Impact:** OOM risk under sustained high load or adversarial block conditions. The 1 Gigagas block limit amplifies memory pressure.
+**Recommendation:** Replace with `bounded_channel(32-64)`.
+
+### GRETH-037: Type-Erased Event Bus Singleton with Panicking Downcast
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/event-bus/src/lib.rs:15-29`
+**Issue:** `PIPE_EXEC_LAYER_EVENT_BUS` stores `Box<dyn Any + Send + Sync>`. Retrieval via `downcast_ref::<PipeExecLayerEventBus<N>>().unwrap()` panics if the generic type `N` at initialization doesn't match retrieval. No compile-time guarantee of type matching.
+**Impact:** Runtime panic if a refactor changes the node primitives type on either side.
+
+### GRETH-038: Thread-Blocking Busy-Wait in Event Bus Access
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/event-bus/src/lib.rs:17-29`
+**Issue:** `get_pipe_exec_layer_event_bus()` uses `std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1))` in a loop with no maximum retry count or timeout. Blocks the OS thread entirely. If the event bus is never initialized, this loops forever.
+**Impact:** Permanent thread hang if initialization fails. If called from a tokio async context (currently not, but no guard), would block a worker thread.
+
+### GRETH-039: No Cryptographic Verification for Cross-Chain Oracle Data
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs:243`
+**Issue:** The oracle relayer trusts `eth_getLogs` responses from the configured RPC endpoint with zero cryptographic proof that the logs exist on the source chain. No Merkle proof verification of log inclusion in blocks. No block header validation against source chain consensus. The fix for GRETH-011 added local topic/address filtering and receipt cross-verification, but this only verifies internal RPC consistency — a compromised RPC can serve internally-consistent fake data.
+**Note:** Extends GRETH-011 fix scope — receipt proof verifies the RPC's own data, not the source chain's data.
+**Impact:** If validators share an RPC provider and it is compromised, fake cross-chain messages could be finalized by quorum.
+
+### GRETH-040: Zero-Signature System Transactions Bypass All Validation
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/metadata_txn.rs:209-227`, `mod.rs:175-193`
+**Issue:** System transactions use `Signature::new(U256::ZERO, U256::ZERO, false)` with no chain_id and are attributed to `SYSTEM_CALLER` via `Recovered::new_unchecked()`. Security relies entirely on on-chain `SystemAccessControl` modifier. No allowlist of target contract addresses at the transaction construction layer.
+**Impact:** Full system compromise if system transaction construction can be influenced by external input. The `SYSTEM_CALLER` can update oracle data, trigger epoch transitions, finish DKG, and modify validator sets.
+
+### GRETH-041: Duplicate `new_system_call_txn()` Definitions
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/metadata_txn.rs:209-227`, `mod.rs:175-193`
+**Issue:** Identical function defined in two locations. If one is updated without the other (e.g., gas limit change), system transactions would behave inconsistently, causing consensus failures between validators running different code versions.
+
+### GRETH-042: `failedProposerIndices` Always Empty
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/metadata_txn.rs:249-250`
+**Issue:** The `onBlockStart` call always passes `failedProposerIndices: vec![]`. If the `Blocker.sol` contract uses this for slashing or reward distribution, the functionality is completely non-operative.
+**Impact:** No proposer slashing — validators that skip proposal slots face no consequences.
+
+### GRETH-043: Nonce Truncation u128 to u64
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/oracle_state.rs:148`, `oracle_manager.rs:303`, `jwk_consensus_config.rs:111`
+**Issue:** Oracle nonces are `u128` internally but silently truncated to `u64` via `as u64` cast. Values above `u64::MAX` wrap around silently, potentially causing the relayer to re-process already-committed events.
+
+---
+
+## MEDIUM Severity (21)
+
+### GRETH-044: Fire-and-Forget tokio::spawn — Panic Propagation Gap
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:269-273`
+**Issue:** `JoinHandle` from `tokio::spawn` discarded. Panics in `process()` are silently swallowed by tokio runtime.
+**Note:** Root cause of GRETH-029. Listed separately as it is independently fixable.
+
+### GRETH-045: Unbounded Task Accumulation in PipeExecService::run()
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:244-276`
+**Issue:** No concurrency limit on spawned `process()` tasks. Each waiting task holds its `ReceivedBlock` (with full transaction list) in memory while waiting on barriers.
+
+### GRETH-046: Non-Atomic Trie Cache Writes
+
+**File:** `crates/storage/storage-api/src/cache.rs:525-579`
+**Issue:** `write_trie_updates()` performs individual `DashMap` operations without a transaction. Concurrent readers could observe partial trie updates.
+**Review Comment:** PARTIAL — DashMap operations are individually thread-safe (sharded locking), so no data corruption. The real risk is limited to concurrent readers observing a partially-applied trie update mid-write (some nodes removed, new nodes not yet inserted). Severity overstated.
+
+### GRETH-049: No Total Supply Cap on Minting
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/mint_precompile.rs:118-132`
+**Issue:** Individual mints capped at `u128::MAX` but no cumulative total supply cap. Compromised authorized caller could mint unlimited tokens.
+
+### GRETH-050: Precompile State Merge Loses Original Storage Values
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:802-821`
+**Issue:** Storage slots from precompile `BundleState` are converted using `present_value` only; original values discarded. This can cause incorrect gas refunds for `SSTORE` and incorrect state diffs for trie updates.
+
+### GRETH-051: System Transaction State Merge Overwrites via HashMap::insert
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:753-756,802-821`
+**Issue:** `HashMap::insert` replaces entire account entry. If mint precompile modifies the balance of an account also touched by a metadata/validator transaction, the storage updates from the system transaction are lost.
+**Recommendation:** Use deep-merge semantics (merge storage maps, take latest AccountInfo).
+
+### GRETH-052: Block Hash Verification Bypassed with None
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:533-535`
+**Issue:** When `block_hash` is `None`, the `assert_eq!` verification is skipped entirely. The `None` path exists for genesis/bootstrap but has no guard preventing it for post-genesis blocks.
+
+### GRETH-053: Block Hash Mismatch Causes Deliberate Node Panic
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:534`
+**Issue:** `assert_eq!(executed_block_hash, block_hash)` — deliberate panic on hash mismatch. Correct for consensus safety but means any non-determinism bug causes all nodes to crash simultaneously.
+
+### GRETH-054: wait_for_block_persistence Blocks Indefinitely
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:1332-1341`
+**Issue:** `rx.await` with no timeout. If persistence never completes (disk full, I/O error), the commit loop stalls permanently. The epoch change does not complete. Consensus hangs.
+
+### GRETH-057: Atomic Ordering Gap Between Epoch and Execute Height
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:238-239,455-457`
+**Issue:** Two independent `AtomicU64` values (`epoch`, `execute_height`) lack cross-variable ordering guarantees. Currently safe because barriers provide true ordering, but fragile under refactoring.
+
+### GRETH-058: No TLS Certificate Pinning for RPC Connections
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/eth_client.rs:58`
+**Issue:** HTTP client uses `use_rustls_tls()` without certificate pinning. Vulnerable to TLS interception by compromised CA.
+
+### GRETH-059: is_unsupported_jwk() Uses Type Name Parsing
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/jwk_oracle.rs:62-66`
+**Issue:** Determines JWK type by checking if `type_name` parses as `u32`. Any new oracle source with a numeric type name would be misrouted.
+
+### GRETH-060: expect()/unwrap() on ABI Decode in Config Fetchers
+
+**Files:** `onchain_config/epoch.rs:65-66`, `dkg.rs:134-135`, `validator_set.rs:54-55,72-73,92-93`
+**Issue:** `expect()` on ABI decode operations. Malformed contract response crashes the node instead of allowing graceful error handling.
+
+### GRETH-062: Relaxed Memory Ordering on Cursor Atomics
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/blockchain_source.rs:157,206`
+**Issue:** `cursor` AtomicU64 uses `Ordering::Relaxed` for all loads/stores. No visibility ordering guarantee with respect to the `last_processed` Mutex-protected state.
+
+### GRETH-063: fromBlock Defaults to 0 When Parameter Missing
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/uri_parser.rs:52-54`
+**Issue:** Missing `fromBlock` parameter causes the relayer to scan from block 0, potentially millions of blocks. Extreme RPC load and delayed startup.
+
+### GRETH-064: Voting Power Conversion Precision Loss
+
+**Files:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/onchain_config/dkg.rs:265-268`, `types.rs:98,131`
+**Issue:** Voting power divided by 10^18 (wei→ether) then truncated to u64. Validators with sub-ether voting power are silently zeroed out. If total exceeds `u64::MAX` ethers, `.to::<u64>()` panics.
+
+---
+
+## LOW Severity (11)
+
+### GRETH-065: BLS Precompile Gas Underpricing
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/bls_precompile.rs:22`
+**Issue:** `POP_VERIFY_GAS = 45,000` — roughly 23% of EIP-2537 equivalent cost (~193,000 gas). Enables computational DoS.
+
+### GRETH-066: Mint Precompile Gas Underpricing
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/mint_precompile.rs:26`
+**Issue:** `MINT_BASE_GAS = 21,000` — same as a simple transfer but performs additional work (mutex, state load, balance modification).
+
+### GRETH-068: Panic on make_canonical Failure
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/tree/mod.rs:541-545`
+**Issue:** Any error from `make_canonical` (including transient RocksDB I/O errors) causes immediate panic. No retry mechanism.
+
+### GRETH-069: Parallel State/Trie Persistence Ordering
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/persistence.rs:225-346`
+**Issue:** State and trie writes happen in separate threads with separate commits. If trie commits before state, another thread could see new trie nodes but old state data. Mitigated by cache overlay.
+
+### GRETH-070: Recovery Does Not Handle Execution Checkpoint Corruption
+
+**File:** `crates/engine/tree/src/recovery.rs:113-142`
+**Issue:** Recovery uses `StageId::Execution` checkpoint as ground truth. If corrupted, recovery operates at wrong block number.
+
+### GRETH-071: Static File Pruning Assumes Block Body Indices Exist
+
+**File:** `crates/storage/provider/src/providers/static_file/manager.rs:1094-1096`
+**Issue:** If `block_body_indices(target_block)` returns `None` in crash scenarios, pruning for transaction-based segments is silently skipped.
+
+### GRETH-072: validator_node_only Skips History But Doesn't Prevent Queries
+
+**Files:** `crates/engine/tree/src/persistence.rs:284`, `crates/storage/provider/src/providers/blockchain_provider.rs:510-531`
+**Issue:** Validator nodes skip history index writes but don't reject historical queries. RPC responses may be empty/incorrect without an explicit error.
+
+### GRETH-073: Potential Arithmetic Underflow in Static File Pruning
+
+**File:** `crates/storage/provider/src/providers/static_file/manager.rs:1093-1096`
+**Issue:** `highest_tx - block.last_tx_num()` could underflow on inconsistent data, producing astronomically large prune count.
+
+### GRETH-074: filter_invalid_txs Uses Effective Gas Price Instead of Max Fee
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/execute/src/lib.rs:1227-1241`
+**Issue:** Balance check uses `effective_gas_price` (min of max_fee and base_fee + priority_fee) instead of `max_fee_per_gas`. Filter is less strict than the EVM's actual validation, allowing some insufficient-balance transactions through to parallel execution.
+
+### GRETH-075: Schema Version Warning Without Action
+
+**File:** `crates/pipe-exec-layer-ext-v2/relayer/src/persistence.rs:60-63`
+**Issue:** Mismatched state file schema version only produces a warning. Incompatible state data loaded regardless, potentially causing incorrect cursor/nonce restoration.
+
+---
+
+## Architectural Recommendations
+
+### R-01: Add Timeouts to ALL Pipeline Barriers (addresses GRETH-029)
+
+Apply `wait_timeout(Duration::from_secs(30))` to `merklize_barrier`, `seal_barrier`, and `make_canonical_barrier`. On timeout, trigger graceful shutdown rather than infinite hang.
+
+### R-02: Protect Cache from Premature Eviction (addresses GRETH-030, GRETH-034)
+
+Cap eviction height: `eviction_height = min(midpoint, persist_height)`. Never evict trie entries above the persist frontier.
+
+### R-03: Implement block_hash_ref (addresses GRETH-031)
+
+Maintain a ring buffer of the last 256 block hashes in `BlockViewStorage`. Populate from sealed blocks.
+
+### R-04: Extract Precompile State Before Epoch Change Returns (addresses GRETH-032)
+
+Add precompile state extraction before every early return in `execute_system_transactions()`.
+
+### R-05: Deep-Merge System Transaction State (addresses GRETH-051)
+
+Replace `HashMap::insert` with entry-based deep merge: merge storage maps, take latest `AccountInfo`.
+
+### R-06: Add Cryptographic Verification for Oracle Data (addresses GRETH-039)
+
+Options: (1) Multi-RPC cross-checking, (2) Merkle proof verification via `eth_getProof`, (3) Source chain light client.
+
+### R-07: Replace Unbounded Channels with Bounded (addresses GRETH-036)
+
+Use `bounded_channel(32-64)` for `ordered_block_tx/rx` to provide backpressure to consensus.
+
+### R-08: Remove Duplicate new_system_call_txn() (addresses GRETH-041)
+
+Consolidate to single definition in `mod.rs`. Have `metadata_txn.rs` use `super::new_system_call_txn()`.
+
+---
+
+## Cross-Reference to Prior Audit
+
+| Prior Finding | Status | Related New Finding |
+|---|---|---|
+| GRETH-005 (Non-atomic DB writes) | Mitigated | GRETH-035 (read-path consequence) |
+| GRETH-011 (Relayer log parsing) | Fixed | GRETH-039 (broader: no cryptographic proof) |
+| GRETH-014 (Read-your-writes) | Documented | GRETH-035 (cross-DB inconsistency) |
+| GRETH-017 (State file integrity) | Fixed | GRETH-075 (schema version handling) |
+
+---
+
+*Report generated by Claude Opus 4.6 multi-agent audit framework.*